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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies two research problems in the field of sourcing. Both
topics address sourcing considerations when the buyer’s potential supplier base con-
sists of incumbent and entrant suppliers. The first topic examines when a buyer
seeking to procure multiple units of an input may find it advantageous to run a
“test auction” where she has incumbents bid on a portion of the desired units. The
test auction reveals incumbent cost information that helps the buyer determine how
many entrants to recruit at a cost prior to awarding the remaining units. The optimal
number of entrant suppliers to recruit follows a threshold policy that is monotonic
in the test auction’s clearing price unless the underlying supplier cost distribution is
not regular. When the buyer uses a reserve price, supplier recruitment can serve as
the buyer’s “outside option:” If the reserve price is not met in the test auction, the
buyer recruits new suppliers and runs a second auction. The attractiveness of the
test auction procedure is compared relative to the more conventional approach in
which the buyer auctions off her entire demand in one auction. Finally, the optimal
mechanism is designed and a numerical study shows that the test with reserve price
strategy performs well given its ease of implementation.
The second topic surrounds the cost information asymmetry that arises when an
entrant competes against an incumbent supplier, and is studied both theoretically
and experimentally. The entrant’s cost uncertainty complicates his ability to bid
in an auction against an incumbent who is more knowledgeable regarding her costs
ix
due to her experience with the buyer. The entrant’s ability to resolve this cost
uncertainty by incurring a learning fee is studied. The entrant follows a threshold
learning strategy that depends on the nature of the unknown cost distribution. The
entrant’s bidding strategy and the buyer-optimal learning fee are analyzed. The
experiment shows that subjects understand the basic intuition but tend to under-
learn and bid too aggressively when they do not learn prior to bidding; this suggests
that buyers need not expend as much effort to reduce the entrant’s learning fee as
theory predicts.
x
CHAPTER I
Introduction
This dissertation studies two topics in sourcing with differentiated suppliers. As
sourcing is a relatively recently-emerging field in operations management, much of the
current research is based upon assumptions that are not applicable in many practical
situations; one such assumption is that all suppliers are homogeneous. The goal of
this dissertation is to address two important research problems that stem from one
of the most basic distinctions among suppliers: their previous experience supplying
the buying firm. Throughout the dissertation, we refer to suppliers who have already
been recruited by the buyer or previously supplied the buyer with the item currently
being sourced as an incumbent supplier, and those who have not supplied the buyer as
a potential entrant supplier. The fundamental differences between these two groups
of suppliers lead to various considerations when a buyer is designing her sourcing
strategy.
The two research problems address a buyer sourcing an item from a supplier pool
consisting of both types of suppliers. We blend different approaches of analyzing
each research problem with the overall goal of providing managerial-level insights;
theoretical, numerical, and experimental methods are used in the two research topics.
In each of the problems, we first develop a mathematical model that allows us to
1
2analyze the buyer and suppliers’ optimal behaviors. In both cases, we primarily use
a second-price auction setting to formally model the competitive bidding process.
Due to the analytical nature of such research, we aim to build intuition that can
illuminate intelligent sourcing mechanisms.
In the topic covered in Chapter II, titled “When to Deploy Test Auctions in Sourc-
ing,” we study a buyer who is seeking to procure a large quantity of an item and
has the costly option of recruiting entrant suppliers to compete with the incumbent
suppliers for the contract. We claim that, under certain conditions, the buyer can
benefit from using a novel “test auction” sourcing method. The motivation behind
the test auction stems from practical concerns: When the recruitment process of
entrant suppliers is time-consuming and costly, a buyer may want to gain a better
understanding of the pricing in the incumbent market before deciding how many
entrants to recruit. After modeling and analyzing this problem from a theoreti-
cal standpoint, we then illustrate the test auction strategy’s performance through
numerical examples and benchmarking against the optimal mechanism.
The second topic (“Entrant Cost Uncertainty and Pre-Auction Learning”) is stud-
ied from both theoretical and experimental perspectives in Chapters III and IV, re-
spectively. For this research problem, we address the cost information asymmetry
that can arise when an entrant supplier competes against an incumbent supplier who
has previously produced the part for the buyer. Namely, if an incumbent supplier
has experience supplying the buyer with the good or service, the incumbent may
be more knowledgeable regarding her costs than an entrant supplier who wishes to
compete to fulfill the contract. The entrant’s cost uncertainty complicates his abil-
ity to bid in an auction against the better-informed incumbent supplier. We model
the case where the entrant can choose to resolve this cost uncertainty by incurring
3a learning fee (e.g., hiring a consultant, holding a test production run, etc.). We
theoretically analyze when the entrant would incur the fee to learn about his costs
prior to competing against the incumbent, and find the entrant’s bid conditional on
his decision. We also model the buyer’s ability to make it easier for the entrant to
learn his costs and find the buyer’s optimal strategy. We then design an experimental
study to test subjects’ behaviors in a laboratory setting. This allows us to identify
which aspects of our theoretical results are robust in practice, and which aspects lead
to unexpected behavior by subjects — and therefore might also lead to suboptimal
decision-making by practitioners.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: In Chapter II, we study
the “test auction” sourcing method. In Chapter III, the costly information acquisi-
tion problem is introduced and theoretical results are discussed. Chapter IV details
how the costly information acquisition problem is tested in a controlled laboratory
setting and provides the results and insights from the experiment. We conclude in
Chapter V.
CHAPTER II
When to Deploy Test Auctions in Sourcing
2.1 Introduction
The average US manufacturer spends close to 60% of their revenues on purchases
from outside suppliers (United States Department of Commerce, 2011). Intense
competition has forced companies to find cost advantages in procurement. To this
end, many firms have expanded their use of competitive bidding, whereby suppliers
fiercely compete against each other in a “reverse auction” in order to win the buyer’s
business.
In this chapter we address the following question: How many bidders should a
buyer recruit for a competitive bidding event? Surprisingly, most research on auctions
takes the existence of bidders as their point of departure. It is clear that firms may
want more bidders as the increased competition may result in better prices. However,
it is not necessarily simple to identify new potential bidders.
Recently the authors worked with a Fortune 500 manufacturer who wanted to
identify new potential suppliers. The manufacturer (the buyer) conducted an ex-
tensive search for potential suppliers for a certain part. The part is used in highly
engineered applications and is produced by high tolerance milling of bar stock on
multi-spindle lathes. The buyer gathered supplier names by scouring various sources,
4
5including library and industry databases, web searches, and other business units
within the firm. They also contacted multi-spindle lathe manufacturers to get cus-
tomer lists. After searching the globe for suppliers, and discarding those who were
too small or lacked ultrasonic washing capabilities (the parts themselves needed to
be extremely clean to be usable in the buyer’s assembly processes), the buyer was
left with a handful of new prospective suppliers.
The approaches a buyer can use to recruit prospective suppliers are not limited
to identifying existing suppliers, but could involve identifying novel sources: At the
buyer firm we interacted with, for parts the buyer firm typically bought from bar
stock finishers, suppliers capable of manufacturing parts out of cold-headed blanks
instead of bar stock were also considered for part segments where the material and
geometry allowed a near net shape blank to be cold headed and then finished through
machining. Buyers can also draw on third party service providers — a large cottage
industry of firms exists to help buyers identify potential suppliers. Trading on their
knowledge and familiarity with suppliers and their capabilities, these firms provide
interested buyer firms with a prospective supplier list, in return for a fee.
Since recruiting new suppliers entails costs for the buyer (in tracking down prospec-
tive suppliers, identifying novel sources, or paying a third party), the decision of how
many bidders to recruit for the auction is not trivial: The number of suppliers to in-
clude in an auction should balance the benefits the buyer anticipates from intensified
bidding competition with the costs of recruiting more suppliers who can produce the
goods the buyer desires.
In fact, the buyer firm we worked with had a few existing suppliers (“incumbents”)
already in the supply base who they knew were capable of making the part. This
is because the suppliers had made similar parts in the past. However, the fact that
6they may have made similar parts in the past does not mean that the buyer will
know how much the supplier will charge for a new part — changes in specifications,
supplier utilization, and economic factors can significantly affect costs. Moreover, the
buyer decided to recruit new suppliers (“entrants”) in order to heat up competition
for producing the part and drive down pricing. The buyer eventually ran a reverse
auction for the parts, with some contracts going to incumbents and some going to
entrants.
After observing the above, and contemplating the time and resources that a buyer
invests in recruiting suppliers, we were left wondering if there could be a way to
manage these supplier recruitment costs. In fact, given how simple it is to run a
reverse auction, a buyer firm could potentially auction off a portion of her demand
in order to gain a better understanding of the pricing in the incumbent market
(whether it is very competitive or not), and based on this determine how many new
suppliers to recruit. Although this is a very natural question that would arise in a
variety of industries and settings (after all, exerting time and effort to recruit new
suppliers is something that many buyers do prior to competitive bidding events),
we could find little prior research addressing it. Filling this gap is the goal of this
chapter.
Other papers have addressed the process of dealing with new suppliers once they
have already been added to buyer’s supply base. In the operations management
literature, these papers typically deal with supplier qualification. The supplier quali-
fication process refers to the act of verifying a potential suppliers’ production abilities,
history with previous customers, financial stability, and other attributes. The main
distinction between new supplier recruitment and supplier qualification stems from
a potential supplier’s ability to place a competitive bid: not-yet-qualified suppli-
7ers could hypothetically place a bid before undergoing the qualification process; by
contrast, in our case suppliers who have not been recruited yet are unable to bid be-
cause they are not aware of the auction and the buyer has not discovered them. The
supplier qualification literature (e.g., Wan and Beil (2009) and Wan et al. (2012))
considers whether it is optimal to delay qualification screening until after the auction.
In our model, the buyer cannot delay recruiting suppliers until after the auction, so
the problems faced are fundamentally different. We focus on the idea of test auctions
to inform the buyer’s decision on how many suppliers to recruit.
Specifically, we model the following trade-off. To ensure competition and realize
the lowest possible cost, a buyer ideally wants as many suppliers to compete for the
contract as possible. However, because recruiting additional suppliers is expensive,
the buyer faces a difficult decision. She can either absorb new supplier recruitment
costs and recruit more suppliers to increase price competition, or instead she can
choose not to add any additional suppliers to her supply base and hope that the
existing suppliers can produce the input at a low cost. Usually the procurement
process must be completed in a timely manner because once a buyer has decided
to put a particular contract out for bid (e.g., because it won new business from an
upstream customer), there is a limited time window within which the supplier(s)
for the contract must be selected. To accommodate the time-consuming nature of
the bid preparation process (e.g., understanding the product specifications, getting
trained on the buyer auction software platform, etc.), for each contract, a buyer can
usually perform one recruitment round whereby she recruits new suppliers who then
prepare their bids in parallel.
Recognizing these complicating factors – the buyer who may already have a few
existing incumbent suppliers needs to assess the benefit of recruiting additional sup-
8pliers against the costs – we examine the following approach when answering the
question of how many bidders to recruit for an auction. The buyer may hold an
initial auction, which we call a “test auction,” for a portion of the units she needs
in order to get pricing information from the existing supply base. Then, the buyer
can use her updated knowledge about the existing suppliers to help her decide how
many additional suppliers to recruit for a final auction in which the remainder of the
units will be sourced. We note that it is fairly common for firms to pick a supplier,
give them some business and consider them for additional business if their price per-
formance meets firm targets. Several firms we have worked with already do this.
Thus, our proposed mechanism would not be out of place in such environments. In
our setting, the unsettled question resolved by the auction is cost/price performance.
Thus, our paper takes two activities that are very common in practice — new sup-
plier recruitment and competitive auctions for sourcing — and combines them in an
innovative way to result in potential cost savings for buyers when sourcing.
In analyzing the buyer’s problem, we answer the following research questions:
1. When is it a good strategy for the buyer to run a test auction versus recruit
additional suppliers and run one auction for all units?
2. How many suppliers should the buyer recruit under each scenario and in the
test auction scenario how does this decision depend on the outcome of the test
auction? Furthermore, how can the buyer best implement a reserve price and
how well do these strategies perform compared to the theoretically optimal (but
perhaps hard to implement) mechanism (along the lines of Myerson (1981))?
3. How do cost distributions, the size of the minimal quantity that has to be
auctioned, the number of incumbent suppliers, and other business factors affect
9these decisions?
There has been a fair amount of literature on sourcing policies that address both
auctions and other types of contracting mechanisms; Elmaghraby (2000) provides
a good review. The main contribution of our paper is the novel “test auction”
procedure, where the buyer may choose to use sequential auctions separated by a
new supplier recruitment round. The test auction serves as a partial cost-discovery
mechanism which the buyer uses to inform her decision regarding how many entrants
suppliers should be added to the supply pool to compete in a subsequent auction.
Peleg et al. (2002) study a setting where the buyer chooses how many suppliers to
recruit for an auction, but they do not study the possibility that the buyer runs a
test auction to update her information about existing suppliers, which is our focus.
de Boer et al. (2000) find the “Economic Tender Quantity” when there are costs
associated with sending RFQs, evaluating suppliers’ tenders, and communicating
the results of the competition. In our model, we study the same type of cost, but
incorporate incumbent suppliers and allow multiple auctions.
Many buyers split their contract among different suppliers. Papers on multi-
sourcing generally focus on mitigating supply disruption risks, e.g., Tomlin (2006),
Federgruen and Yang (2009), Chaturvedi and Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niz (2011), Yang et al.
(2012). Our buyer also can multi-source, but for an entirely different reason. In our
paper, multi-sourcing can be a consequence of the buyer discovering information
about the incumbents’ costs.
To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to consider the use of test auctions to help
manage new supplier recruitment and sourcing costs. Our paper should assist firms
to better manage their total (contracting+new supplier recruitment) procurement
costs.
10
2.2 Model
We model a risk-neutral, cost-minimizing buyer who seeks to procure Q units of a
certain input. For example, Q could be in the tens or hundreds of thousands, corre-
sponding to months or years of supply of a certain component. We initially assume
that the contracts for these units will be awarded using open-bid descending-price
procurement auctions, which proceed as follows: The auction price falls continuously
until all but one bidder drops out; the last remaining bidder wins the auction and is
paid the auction ending price. (Auctions with a continuously falling price are also
known as “reverse clock auctions”; see Ausubel and Cramton (2006) for discussions
about clock auctions in practice.) Of course, the buyer could use other mechanisms
to award the contract. In §2.3.4, we will study the optimal mechanism that the buyer
could use to award the contract. However, open-bid descending-price auctions are
ubiquitous in practice and are easy to explain and implement. (In §2.4.1, we address
the other common auction format, the first-price sealed-bid auction.)
We assume that whenever the buyer runs an auction she has to auction off at
least y units. Auctions for very small quantities may not generate much interest from
suppliers and that is why we model a minimum purchase quantity. (For example,
an auction to buy one standard bolt is not going to entice any suppliers to bid.)
Different industries may have different minimum order quantities, and our model
allows for any 0 ≤ 2y ≤ Q (if Q < 2y, a test auction is not feasible since the buyer’s
desired quantity Q would be so small that she must auction off her entire order in a
single auction).
We assume that there are two groups of suppliers: incumbent suppliers and as-of-
yet-unknown potential suppliers. The incumbent suppliers can be viewed as suppliers
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whom the buyer has recruited in the past and thus further recruitment is unneces-
sary. This may be because the supplier has produced a previous generation of the
product or has supplied a similar product. Companies we have worked with will
typically have at most a few incumbents for any given part (e.g., there were only
two incumbents for many parts at the buyer firm mentioned in the Introduction).
We let n denote the number of incumbent suppliers. There are also suppliers who
are as-of-yet unknown; we call these potential or entrant suppliers. To recruit these
suppliers, the buyer incurs a cost. For example, the cost may stem from scouring
the globe for existing suppliers, developing novel sources, or paying a third party a
finder’s fee. The expected cost to recruit m entrant suppliers is k(m). We assume
that k(·) is an increasing convex (possibly weakly convex) function. This captures
the fact that each successive entrant is typically more costly for the buyer to identify
because the buyer will exhaust the most cost-effective avenues of recruitment first.
Further, we assume that k(1) > 0 — that is, the buyer cannot recruit an entrant for
free (alternatively, cases where k(1) = 0 can be handled by our model by considering
the entrants who cost zero for the buyer to recruit as incumbent suppliers).
As is common in the literature (e.g., Chen (2007)) we assume each supplier i is
risk-neutral and has a linear production cost function xi · q, where q is the number of
units to be produced. The xi’s are independent and identically distributed random
variables with cumulative distribution F , probability distribution f , and support
[a, b]. Further, we assume that the cost distribution F is regular (i.e., x + F (x)
f(x)
is increasing in x), which is a common assumption in the auction literature. It is
important to note that the new supplier recruitment process is aimed at identification
of suppliers, not cost discovery. This is why the buyer needs to run an auction
among the recruited suppliers for cost discovery. Each supplier’s variable cost xi is
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their private information, but the distribution F is common knowledge. We assume
that the buyer must transact with a supplier; this captures cases where the buyer is
purchasing a component that is needed in order to assemble her products, but the
buyer does not have in-house production capabilities for the component.
In general once a buyer has decided to put a particular contract out for bid,
there is a limited time window within which new contracts must be struck. To
accommodate the fact that time is required for entrant suppliers to be identified,
understand the buyer’s specifications, get trained on the buyer’s auction software
platform, etc., within the sourcing time window we are considering the firm can only
recruit suppliers once (although the firm can recruit multiple, m, entrant suppliers
in parallel). This eliminates the possibility of the buyer spending many months
identifying and waiting while an entrant prepares to bid in an initial auction, then
spending many more months doing the same for a second entrant followed by a
second auction, then spending many more months for a third entrant, etc. Such a
“sequential screening” setting has been studied in McAfee and McMillan (1988), but
the common practical setting that we are studying allows for recruitment only once
during the procurement cycle.
2.2.1 Main Trade-Off
The buyer must decide if she wants to (i) recruit additional entrant suppliers up-
front or (ii) auction a portion of the units among the incumbent suppliers to inform
her decision regarding how many entrants to recruit, and then procure the remaining
units through a subsequent auction. On the one hand, the first option increases
competition for all the units. However, this may not be optimal for the buyer. One
can imagine that if the buyer auctions off a subset of the units before recruiting
any entrants, she may discover important cost information about the incumbent
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suppliers. If the incumbent suppliers’ cost realizations are small, then spending
additional money to recruit entrant suppliers is not as attractive as it was ex ante,
and thus recruitment costs could be saved. Likewise, if the buyer discovers that
the incumbent suppliers have relatively high costs, she may choose to recruit more
entrant suppliers than she would have prior to discovering this information. Thus,
deploying an initial auction for a subset of the units informs the buyer’s decision
regarding how many additional suppliers to recruit. However, with the test auction
approach, the buyer may end up paying a high price for the units she buys in the first
auction, while recruiting additional suppliers before running this auction would have
resulted in potentially lower prices for these units. This is an interesting trade-off
that has not been previously studied.
First we note that if the buyer decides to recruit some entrant suppliers prior to
holding any auctions, she would just hold a single auction for all Q units. This is
because the buyer will not be able to initiate a second recruitment round and the
competing suppliers all have linear cost structures. We will call this strategy the
no-test strategy.
Conversely, we will call the case where the buyer holds an initial auction with the
n incumbent suppliers to inform her decision regarding how many entrant suppliers
to recruit for a second auction for the remaining units the test strategy. We
assume the buyer uses the clearing price of the first auction as a cap on the per-
unit bids that the buyer will accept in the second auction. In essence, in the first
auction, the auction price continuously descends until a single bidder remains in
the auction. At this point, the price clock stops and the buyer recruits entrant
suppliers to compete over the remaining units. When the second auction begins, the
price clock continues to descend from the price at which the clock stopped, i.e. the
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clearing price of the first auction. As would be natural, we also assume that if the
clearing price of the first auction is sufficiently low, the buyer may choose to source
all Q units from the winning incumbent supplier at that price. Given our model of
the test strategy, it is optimal for the buyer to hold a single y-unit auction prior to
recruitment (guaranteeing that the buyer spends the minimal amount in order to
learn about the incumbents’ costs) and then hold a single auction afterwards for the
remaining Q− y units (see Proposition II.1).
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 depict the timeline for the test and no-test strategies, respec-
tively. X(i:j) denotes the i
th-lowest value among j independent draws from distribu-
tion F (in the figures “bidder (i : j)” refers to the bidder with the ith lowest cost
among j bidders). Having described the main trade-offs, we now move to addressing
the research questions posed in the Introduction.
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Figure 2.1: Timeline of the test strategy.
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Figure 2.2: Timeline of the no-test strategy.
2.3 Analysis
In this section, we first formulate the buyer’s expected costs under the test and
no-test strategies which will then enable us to characterize situations when one is
preferred to the other.
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2.3.1 The Test and No-Test Strategies
Under the test strategy, the buyer first holds an auction for the minimum order
quantity (y units) with only the incumbent suppliers, then determines how many
additional suppliers to recruit, and lastly she auctions off the remaining Q− y units
where the opening bid is equal to the clearing price from the first auction. The
buyer’s per-unit payment for the first y units is the second-lowest cost among the
n incumbent suppliers (Proposition II.1 below shows that in equilibrium suppliers
remain in an auction until either winning or reaching their true cost, whichever
happens first); hence, the expected cost of the first auction under the test strategy
is E[X(2:n)]y. For convenience, we define x as the realization of X(2:n), the clearing
price of the test auction. Thus x is also the opening bid of the second auction. After
holding the initial auction, the buyer must decide how many additional suppliers to
recruit. The cost information revealed in the test auction (specifically, the value of
x) allows the buyer to make a more informed decision than she would if she did not
hold a test auction. The expected cost of the second auction (including recruitment
costs) when mT additional suppliers are recruited is
E[X(2:n+mT )|X(2:n) = x](Q− y) + k(mT ). (2.1)
In equation (2.1) the expectation is written as the second-lowest among n + mT
draws, conditioned on the fact that the outcome of the test auction (among the n
incumbents) was clearing price x. Note that this could be equivalently described
as the expected cost from an auction that opens at price x, with one bidder whose
cost is at most x (the winning incumbent from the test auction) competing for the
contract alongside mT entrants. We will use this type of conditioning throughout
the paper. We let m∗T denote the minimizer of (2.1). Note that m
∗
T is actually a
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function of x, but for convenience we simply write m∗T . The buyer’s total ex ante
expected cost under the test strategy is the (expected) sum of the two auction costs
and the recruitment costs:
E[X(2:n)]y+E
[
E[X(2:n+m∗T )|X(2:n) = x](Q− y) + k(m∗T )
]
(Buyer’s expected cost under test).
If the buyer bypasses the test auction and selects the no-test strategy, she first
chooses how many entrant suppliers to recruit, and then holds a single auction for
Q units. If the buyer qualifies mN additional suppliers, her expected cost (the sum
of the auction payment and recruitment costs) is E[X(2:n+mN )]Q + k(mN). Let m∗N
denote the minimizer of this cost; the buyer’s total ex ante expected cost under the
no-test strategy is thus
E[X(2:n+m∗N )]Q+ k(m
∗
N) (Buyer’s expected cost under no-test).
The structure of the test and no-test strategies is characterized by the following
proposition (proofs for our results can be found in §2.6).
Proposition II.1. In equilibrium, under the test and no-test strategies, suppliers
in an auction will remain in it until either the price reaches their true cost or they
win the auction, whichever happens first. Under the test strategy, it is optimal for
the buyer to auction off y units in the first auction and Q − y units in the second
auction. The buyer’s total cost function under the test strategy is discrete convex
in the number of entrant suppliers she recruits, mT . Moreover, the optimal number
of entrant suppliers to recruit, m∗T , is nondecreasing in the realization of the unit
clearing price of the first auction, x = X(2:n). Similarly, under the no-test strategy,
the buyer’s total cost function is discrete convex in the number of entrant suppliers
she recruits, mN .
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The proposition proves that the buyer’s expected cost under both strategies is
discrete convex in m, which simplifies the buyer’s choice regarding the number of
entrants to recruit (because if the buyer prefers recruiting m entrant suppliers to
recruiting m + 1 entrant suppliers, she also prefers recruiting m to any m′ > m +
1). Further, the result states that under the test strategy the buyer will recruit
a relatively small number of entrants if she realizes that the price she has to pay
the winning incumbent is low, and she will be willing to recruit a larger number
of entrants if she realizes the incumbents have high costs. This occurs because
the expected benefit of recruiting an entrant supplier (namely, the reduction in the
expected clearing price of the second auction for Q−y units) increases as the clearing
price of the test auction increases.
Although the result that the number of entrants to recruit is nondecreasing in
the clearing price of the test auction may seem intuitive at first, it may not hold if
our model’s regularity assumption is violated. For example, consider the case where
the buyer needs to source 1,000,000 units and the suppliers’ cost distribution pdf is
given by
f(x) =

0.1 if x ∈ [8, 9]
0.9 if x ∈ [11, 12]
0 elsewhere.
This cost distribution results in a uniformly-distributed cost on [8, 9] with 10 percent
probability and a uniformly-distributed cost on [11, 12] with 90 percent probability.
This represents the case where most suppliers are likely to have a relatively high cost,
but a few may have a lower cost (e.g., because they have lower labor costs or have
recently freed up capacity that they need to fill). Suppose the buyer has already
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sourced 300,000 units through an auction with the incumbent suppliers and she is
deciding how many entrants to recruit before holding the second auction for the
remaining units, and let the recruitment cost be k(m) = 154,000 ·m — that is, the
buyer’s marginal cost of recruiting an entrant is constant. If the clearing price of the
test auction is x = 11, the buyer will find it optimal to recruit one entrant prior to
the second auction. However, if the clearing price of the test auction is x = 11.1, the
buyer will find it optimal to recruit zero entrants — the number of entrants to recruit
decreases when the clearing price of the test auction increases! When the clearing
price is x = 11, the buyer is certain that the winning incumbent supplier has a cost
in [8, 9], and is willing to recruit an entrant because with probability 0.1 the entrant
will also have a low cost, resulting in the buyer realizing significant savings in the
second auction. However, when the clearing price is x = 11.1, the buyer is uncertain
of whether the winning incumbent is in the [8, 9] or [11, 11.1] cost region (in fact,
the winning incumbent has a cost in the higher region with probability 0.47). As
a result, the buyer does not find it optimal to recruit entrant suppliers because the
expected unit cost savings are less than the associated recruitment cost.
This example serves to point out that although it is intuitive that the number of
entrants to recruit should increase in the clearing price of the test auction, this is not
a foregone conclusion. What Proposition II.1 shows, however, is that m∗T increases
in x provided that we have regularity, namely x+ F (x)
f(x)
increases in x. Note that the
regularity condition is satisfied by many distributions such as the uniform, normal,
and Pareto distributions and is also common in the auction literature, and we will
use regularity in the sequel.
We finally note that it is never optimal for the buyer to use the no-test strategy and
recruit m∗N = 0 entrant suppliers. Such a policy is weakly dominated by using the test
19
strategy: Instead of choosing to not recruit additional suppliers prior to procuring
the entire batch of Q units, the buyer could use the test strategy and do no worse
in expectation. This indicates that buyers who just auction off their entire desired
quantity without recruiting new suppliers (or running a test auction) are following a
suboptimal policy. Thus, buyers who typically use only existing incumbent suppliers
for new components without testing their prices first or recruiting entrants may have
an opportunity to lower costs.
2.3.2 Test and No-Test Strategies with a Reserve Price
In the test strategy, the buyer opens the second auction’s bidding at X2:n, the
clearing price of the test auction. The logic is simple: Since competition among
incumbents already pushed the per-unit price to X2:n in the initial auction, the
buyer knows she need not pay more than X2:n per unit in the second auction when she
includes additional bidders (entrants). In this section we will allow for the possibility
that the buyer might also use a reserve price in the test auction itself.
A test auction reserve price helps the buyer avoid paying a high cost in the test
auction. But when the buyer sets a reserve price in the test auction, she must consider
the possibility that this reserve price might not be met and thus the buyer might not
transact with the suppliers in the auction. In practice, many buyers we have dealt
with need to procure items that they are not capable of producing themselves. The
buyer relies on suppliers for production. Although the auction literature commonly
uses the notion of an “outside option cost” (needed when setting a reserve price),
such a cost typically is assumed to be exogenous; for instance, the cost of forgoing
the contract. However, would the buyer forgo the contract if the reserve price is not
met? In reality, if the reserve price is not met and the buyer has sufficient time to
recruit new entrants, a buyer could re-run the auction with a new set of suppliers.
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This is what we capture in our model, as explained below. To our knowledge, this
is the first paper to inform this decision by endogenizing the cost of recruiting new
suppliers and re-running an auction.
If the buyer sets a reserve price r1 for the test auction, one of three outcomes
occur: (i) multiple incumbents bid at or below the reserve price and the ending price
of the auction is set according to the second-lowest bid; (ii) exactly one incumbent
bids at or below the reserve price and the ending price of the auction is set at the
reserve price, or; (iii) no incumbent bids at or below the reserve price and there
is no transaction. Following the test auction, the buyer decides how many entrant
suppliers to recruit. To enforce the inherent threat of the reserve price, we assume
the buyer discards any incumbent not meeting the reserve price. This means that
under case (iii), the buyer removes all the incumbent suppliers from her supplier
pool, and to satisfy her demand she recruits new entrants and then procures all the
units from them in the second auction.
It is a weakly optimal strategy for the buyer to use a reserve price, since she
can always set the reserve equal to the upper bound of the suppliers’ unit cost,
b. Of course, in the test auction she might set it below this level, knowing that
she can recruit entrant suppliers for a second auction if the reserve is not met by
an incumbent. That is, despite the fact that the buyer needs the units and must
eventually transact with a supplier, she can take a risk and set a low reserve price
in the test auction. If the test auction clears, its clearing price, min{r1, X(2:n)}, acts
as a de facto reserve price for the second auction as this price serves as the opening
bid in the second auction (and the buyer also has the option to award the remaining
Q − y units to the lowest-bidding incumbent at this price). The buyer cannot use
a lower reserve price in the second auction because the buyer does not have time to
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perform a second recruitment round if zero suppliers meet the reserve. For the same
reason, if the test auction does not clear (zero incumbents meet the reserve r1), the
buyer sets the second auction’s opening bid (reserve price) to b.
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Figure 2.3: Timeline of the test with reserve price strategy.
Figure 2.3 depicts the timeline for the test with reserve price strategy. Under the
test with reserve price strategy, the buyer first holds an auction with a reserve price
(r1) for the minimum order quantity (y units) with only the n incumbent suppliers.
The buyer’s optimal reserve price depends on her expected outside option cost – the
cost which she expects to incur if zero incumbents meet the reserve. The buyer’s
outside option is purchasing the Q units from the entrants, which in expectation
costs her
C1 , min
m1≥1
{
E[X(2:m1)]Q+ k(m1)
}
, (2.2)
where m1 refers to the number of entrants that the buyer will recruit if the reserve
r1 is not met, and X(2:1) , b, the upper bound of the suppliers’ unit cost. When
m1 = 1, the buyer recruits a single entrant supplier and sets a reserve price equal to
b in order to award the Q-unit contract to the sole entrant at the upper bound of his
unit cost distribution.
One can show that when the test auction starts at reserve price r1, the incumbents
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still have a weakly dominant strategy of remaining in the test auction until either
winning the auction or reaching their true cost. We now evaluate the buyer’s test
strategy when at least one incumbent bids down to the reserve price. If at least two
incumbents meet the reserve, the buyer’s per-unit payment for the first y units is
the second-lowest cost among the n incumbent suppliers. If one incumbent meets
the reserve, the buyer’s payment for the first y units is r1 per unit. Hence, the
expected cost of the first auction under the test strategy given that the reserve
is met is E[min{X(2:n), r1}] · y. For convenience, we define x as the realization of
min{X(2:n), r1}, the clearing price of the test auction when the reserve is met. After
holding the initial auction, the buyer must decide how many additional suppliers to
recruit. The cost information revealed in the test auction (specifically, the value of
x) allows the buyer to make a more informed decision than she would if she did not
hold a test auction. The expected cost of the second auction (including recruitment
costs) when mT additional suppliers are recruited is
E[min{x,X(2:n+mT )}|min{X(2:n), r1} = x](Q− y) + k(mT ). (2.3)
In equation (2.3) the expectation is of the clearing price of the second auction,
conditioned on the fact that the outcome of the test auction was clearing price x.
Under the test with reserve price strategy, m∗T is the minimizer of (2.3). The buyer’s
total expected cost given that an incumbent meets the reserve price r1 under the test
strategy is the (expected) sum of the two auction costs and the recruitment costs:
C2 , E[min{X(2:n), r1}]y+E
[
E[min{x,X(2:n+m∗T )}|min{X(2:n), r1} = x](Q− y) + k(m∗T )
]
.
We can now represent the buyer’s total ex ante expected cost under the test
strategy with reserve price r1:
Pr(X(1:n) > r1) · C1 + Pr(X(1:n) ≤ r1) · C2 (Buyer’s expected cost under test).
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The first term addresses the buyer’s cost when the test auction reserve price is not
met, while the second term encompasses all cases where the reserve is met. Define
L(x) , x · y + E[min{x,X(2:n+m∗T )}|X(1:n) ≤ x ≤ X(2:n)] · (Q− y) + k(m∗T )
= x · y + min
mT
(
E[min{x,X(2:n+mT )}|X(1:n) ≤ x ≤ X(2:n)] · (Q− y) + k(mT )
)
.
(2.4)
We now characterize the optimal reserve price, r∗1, in terms of the buyer’s expected
outside option cost (equation (2.2)) and the buyer’s total expected cost when the
reserve price is met with clearing price x (equation (2.4)). Specifically, the buyer-
optimal reserve price r∗1 for the test auction satisfies:
r∗1 , arg min
r1∈[a,b]
(
F (r1)
nC1 + nF (r1)F (r1)
n−1L(r1) +
∫ r1
a
n(n− 1)f(s)F (s)F (s)n−2L(s)ds
)
(2.5)
where F (x) , (1−F (x)) is the complementary cumulative distribution function. In
equation (2.5), the first term corresponds to the case where zero incumbents meet
the reserve price, resulting in the buyer eliminating the incumbents from competition
for the units and resorting to her outside option of recruiting new suppliers. The
second term represents the case where a single incumbent meets reserve price r∗1,
resulting in a clearing price equal to the reserve. The final term covers cases where
at least two incumbent suppliers meet the reserve price. We next show that when
deciding how many entrants to recruit, the reserve price fits into the buyer’s decision
in a very straightforward way.
Proposition II.2. If the reserve price is met and the clearing price is x = min{r∗1, X(2:n)},
the buyer will recruit the same number of entrants as she would if x were the clearing
price of a test auction without a reserve price.
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We now address the use of a reserve price under the no-test strategy. Even
though the reserve price helps protect the buyer from high incumbent costs in the
test strategy, it may sometimes still be optimal to recruit entrant suppliers prior
to holding the auction. Under the no-test strategy, the buyer performs recruitment
prior to the auction. As a result, the buyer’s optimal reserve price is the suppliers’
per unit cost upper bound, b, because she would not be able to recruit additional
suppliers if the reserve was unmet. Rather than using an aggressive reserve price
rooted in the fallback option of recruiting additional entrants, in the no-test case
the buyer has already gone ahead and recruited the additional entrants. In essence,
instead of using a reserve price based on expectations of what these new suppliers’
costs will be, the buyer simply includes these new suppliers in the auction. The
upshot is that, although the buyer cannot use an interior reserve price in the no-test
case, by proactively adding entrants to the supplier pool she lowers her unit costs
for the entire Q-unit contract.
2.3.3 Comparison of the Strategies
To understand the trade-off between test and no-test, consider the following nu-
merical example. Assume the suppliers’ unit costs are uniformly distributed between
$5 and $15, the buyer has 5 incumbent suppliers, needs to source 50,000 units, the
minimum order quantity is 2,500 units, and the cost to recruit each entrant supplier
is $17,500 (e.g., this could be the cost of time spent gathering supplier lists, contact-
ing suppliers and sifting through them for fit, working with engineering to explain
the RFQ to them, training them on the auction platform, etc.). Under this scenario,
if the buyer chooses the no-test strategy, she will find it optimal to recruit m∗N = 2
entrant suppliers, and then hold one auction for all 50,000 units with the 7 suppliers.
As a result, she will pay $35,000 in recruitment costs and will expect to pay $7.5 per
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unit, for a total expected cost of $410,000.
If the buyer chooses the test strategy, she will first hold an auction for the min-
imum order quantity with the 5 incumbent suppliers and then decide how many
entrant suppliers to recruit based on the clearing price of the first auction. Per
Proposition II.1, the optimal number to recruit increases in the outcome of the test
auction. In this example, she will recruit anywhere from 0 to 5 entrant suppliers,
where the optimal number to recruit is illustrated by Figure 2.4.
clearing price of 
test auction
a=5 b=15
mT*= 0 52 3 41
8.78.3 9.2 9.9 11.4
PooledUniformComparison(10,20,500,50,130,5,0.1)
No-Test = $6501, m_N*=3
Test = $6420
For reserve r_y: If no one meets it, the optimal number to 
qualify m_ry = 7, and costs $6679, and r_y is around 17.1
Key = PooledUniformComparison(a,b,Q,y,K,n,step)
Figure 2.4: Optimal number of entrants to recruit given the clearing price of the test auction.
In this case, the test strategy results in an expected total cost (expected cost
of the first auction, expected cost of the second auction, and expected recruitment
costs) of $397,013 — a net savings1 of 8.1 percent. As a result, the buyer prefers the
test strategy to the no-test strategy.
If the buyer can implement a reserve price in the test auction, the optimal reserve
is r∗1 = $7.5. If the reserve is met, Proposition II.2 states that the buyer will recruit
the same number of entrants that she would recruit under the regular test strategy
with the same clearing price (given by Figure 2.4); in this case the buyer would recruit
zero additional suppliers and source all Q units from the lowest cost incumbent. If
the reserve is not met, the buyer would find it optimal to recruit 7 entrants and hold
an auction for all Q units among the entrants. In this case, the test with reserve
price strategy results in an expected total cost of $386,410 — a net savings of 14.7
percent over the no-test strategy.
Finally, since buyers in practice may be tempted to just auction a contract with-
1We define net savings as the percent savings after subtracting the baseline (minimum possible) cost — in this
case, the baseline cost is a · Q = $250,000. The buyer will incur this baseline as part of her cost regardless of her
strategy, and thus we do not consider it when comparing her options.
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out running a test auction or recruiting additional suppliers, we consider the case
where the buyer holds a single auction, only inviting the incumbents. In this case,
implementing the test strategy without (with) a reserve price results in a net savings
of 11.8 (18.2) percent over this suboptimal policy. Once again, in an environment
where 2-3% savings can amount to millions of dollars a year, the advantages of a
more sophisticated strategy as proposed in this paper can be significant.
The following comparative statics provide insights that are helpful for buyers
wondering if a test auction approach is appropriate for their situation.
Proposition II.3. (i) Holding all other parameters constant, the buyer prefers the
test strategy without a reserve price over the no-test strategy if
(a) The minimum order quantity, y, is sufficiently small.
(b) The number of incumbents, n, is sufficiently large.
(c) The new supplier recruitment cost, k(m), grows proportionately large enough
(i.e., the recruitment cost is taken to be a · k(m) and a ∈ R+ is sufficiently large).
(d) The cost distribution variance factor α is sufficiently small, where f˜(x) = f(x+∆
α
)
with ∆ ∈ R and α ∈ R+.
(ii) Moreover, if the buyer prefers the test without a reserve price strategy to the
no-test strategy, then the buyer prefers the test with a reserve price strategy to the
no-test strategy.
To understand part (a), note that a smaller y makes the test auction more at-
tractive because the risk with a test strategy is that an incumbent wins an order
at a high price. However, as y decreases, the amount risked becomes smaller. Sim-
ilar intuition explains part (b): When the number of incumbents is large, there is
more competition during the test auction stage and the buyer is less likely to pay
a high price for the first y units, increasing the attractiveness of the test auction.
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Part (c) follows because when it is expensive to recruit suppliers, the buyer needs to
be more judicious about how many entrants to recruit. Using a test auction helps
her decide the exact number of entrants to recruit and avoids the risk of recruiting
too many, which would be expensive when the function k(m) grows proportionately
larger. Part (d) appears counterintuitive at first sight. After all, one may think that
price discovery is more beneficial when prices are more variable. The flip side of the
coin is that when prices are less variable, the firm has a lower chance of paying too
much for the first y units in a test auction and the test auction is less risky. Finally,
part (ii) of the proposition follows from the fact that allowing the buyer to use a
reserve price never makes her worse off.
2.3.4 Optimal Mechanism
In the previous subsection, we investigated when the buyer can benefit from imple-
menting the test auction strategy versus the commonly-employed no-test strategy.
Although we saw that employing test auctions can provide significant benefits, it
would be interesting to see how well the test strategy performs compared to an
optimal mechanism the buyer may use to source parts. We note that optimal mech-
anisms are often difficult to implement but serve as good bounds on the performance
of more easily implementable approaches. To this end, we find the optimal mecha-
nism for the buyer’s procurement problem in order to investigate our test strategy’s
relative performance. The revelation principle is described in Krishna (2002) as fol-
lows: “Given a mechanism and an equilibrium for that mechanism, there exists a
direct mechanism in which (i) it is an equilibrium for each [supplier] to report his or
her value truthfully and (ii) the outcomes are the same as in the given equilibrium
of the original mechanism.” We can apply the revelation principle in our setting,
where the equilibrium involves the suppliers’ bidding strategy, the buyer’s allocation
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and payment rules, and the buyer’s recruitment decision rule. Thus, we restrict our
attention to direct mechanisms, as formalized below.
For supplier i, we denote his reported cost as si and his true cost as xi, and
we use −i to represent j, ∀j 6= i. The purchase quantity from and payment to
supplier i are denoted by Qi(si, s−i) and Pi(si, s−i), respectively. When supplier
i reports cost si and all other suppliers report their cost truthfully, supplier i’s
expected payment, quantity, and utility are, respectively, pi(si) = EX−i [Pi(si, X−i)],
qi(si) = EX−i [Qi(si, X−i)], and ui(si) = pi(si) − xiqi(si). We refer to the vector of
incumbents’ costs as xI , and let mT (x
I) denote the number of entrants the buyer
recruits based on the incumbents’ costs. Similarly, we let xE denote the vector of
the recruited entrant’s costs, and let x , [xI , xE].
The buyer’s mechanism design problem is
min
Qi(x),Pi(x),mT (xI)
E
[
k(mT (X
I)) +
n+mT (X
I)∑
i=1
pi(Xi)
]
(2.6)
s.t. ui(xi) ≥ 0 ∀xi,∀i (2.7)
ui(xi) ≥ ui(si) ∀si 6= xi, ∀xi,∀i (2.8)
n+mT (x
I)∑
i=1
Qi(xi, x−i) = Q ∀x (2.9)
Qi(xi, x−i) ∈ {0, y, y + 1, . . . , Q} ∀x, ∀i (2.10)
The objective function states that the buyer minimizes her expected total cost (re-
cruitment costs plus payments to suppliers) by choosing the quantity allocation rule,
payment rule, and the number of recruited entrants, mT (x
I). Equation (2.7) is
the standard individual rationality constraint, while equation (2.8) is the incentive
compatibility constraint. Equation (2.9) states that the desired Q units has to be
procured, while (2.10) addresses the minimum order quantity, y, consistent with
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our model described in §2.2. The quantity allocation, payment, and recruitment
rules that solve this constrained cost minimization problem will serve as a lower
bound on the expected cost the buyer could achieve regardless of sourcing mech-
anism — whether it be the test strategy, no-test strategy, or any other sourcing
mechanism (e.g., negotiation, first-price sealed-bid auction, Dutch auction, etc.).
Let ψ(xi) = xi +
F (xi)
f(xi)
denote the virtual cost function, where ψ(·) is increasing
because of the regularity assumption.
Proposition II.4. The following constitutes an optimal mechanism: Based on the
incumbent suppliers’ reported cost vector xI , the number of entrants recruited by the
buyer is
m∗T (x
I) = arg min
mT (xI)∈N
{
k(mT (x
I)) + E[ψ(X(1:n+mT (xI)))|xI(1:n))] ·Q
}
(2.11)
where m∗T is nondecreasing in x
I
(1:n) and constant in x
I
(2:n), x
I
(3:n), . . . , x
I
(n:n). Define
x˜I ,

[ti, x
I
(2:n), x
I
(3:n), . . . , x
I
(n:n)] if x(1:n+m∗T (xI)) = x
I
(1:n)
xI otherwise.
Let i be the lowest-cost supplier, i.e., xi = x(1:n+m∗T (xI)). The buyer pays i
P ∗(x) = x(1:n+m∗T (xI)) ·Q+
∫ x
(2:n+m∗
T
(xI ))
x
(1:n+m∗
T
(xI ))
(1− F (ti))(m∗T (x˜I)−m∗T (xI)) ·Qdti (2.12)
to supply the Q units while the remaining suppliers are not awarded any units and
are paid zero.
Under this mechanism, the buyer views the incumbents’ vector of reported costs,
xI , and recruits m∗T (x
I) entrants based on these reports. After the m∗T (x
I) entrants
report their costs, the buyer awards the Q-unit contract to the supplier with the
lowest report and pays him P ∗(x). The first term of (2.12) is the winning supplier’s
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true cost, while the second term represents a markup that rewards the supplier for
truthfully revealing his cost. If the winning supplier is an entrant supplier, we note
that x˜I = xI and the markup is equal to the difference between the second-lowest
report and the winning supplier’s report. Thus, in the case where an entrant is
awarded the contract, P ∗(x) = x(2:n+m∗T (xI)) · Q and the winning entrant supplier is
paid the second-lowest reported cost.
We now address the markup when the winning supplier is an incumbent. The
markup paid to a winning incumbent supplier represents the amount by which the
supplier could have inflated his reported cost and still won the contract. The im-
portant point is that a winning incumbent supplier’s reported cost also influences
the buyer’s recruitment decision. Hence, the markup of an incumbent supplier
who eventually wins the contract must account for the increased competition (i.e.,
m∗T (x˜
I)−m∗T (xI) additional entrants) associated with an inflated reported cost.
Although the optimal mechanism described in Proposition II.4 results in the min-
imum expected cost for the buyer, the buyer may still be unable to use such a
mechanism in practice. The described mechanism requires the incumbent suppli-
ers to reveal their true cost before the buyer recruits suppliers to compete for the
units up for bid. Revealing such information prior to the recruitment round will not
result in a contract (even for the minimum order quantity) for the incumbents —
it will only help the buyer make a more accurate decision on how many entrants
to recruit. A buyer may find it difficult to convince a supplier to reveal his cost
information just so the buyer can decide how many suppliers to recruit to compete
against him. Although the test strategy analyzed in §2.3.1–2.3.3 allows the buyer to
gather quotes from the incumbents, the guaranteed award of a minimum of y units
to the winning incumbent supplier (given he meets the reserve price, if applicable)
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provides an incentive for the incumbents to reveal such information — it is the min-
imum quantity required to induce suppliers to bid. There is no such offer under the
optimal mechanism. Further, we note that in the test strategy bidders have to beat
their competitors’ pricing but do not have to reveal their true cost to win; under this
mechanism, the lowest-cost supplier still has to reveal his cost.
Regardless of whether the buyer would be able to implement the optimal mecha-
nism in practice, the optimal mechanism can be used as a theoretical benchmark to
quantify the relative performance of the test and no-test strategies; the “optimality
gap” between the optimal mechanism and the test and no-test strategies can help the
buyer gauge whether the cost and effort of attempting to implement more complex
mechanisms than the test and no-test strategies are worth the savings.
2.3.5 Comparison of the Optimal Mechanism with Test and No-Test Strategies
We can now compare the buyer’s expected cost under the optimal mechanism
to her costs when employing the test and no-test strategies. We calculated the
test and no-test strategies’ performance relative to the optimal mechanism in a
wide range of situations by generating 81 problem instances. We chose a low,
medium, and high value for the recruitment cost, number of incumbents, width
of the suppliers’ cost distribution, and minimum order quantity that needs to be
offered to suppliers in the test auction to induce them to participate, where the
medium value corresponded to the value from the example in §2.3.3. Specifically,
the parameters studied included k(m) ∈ {12500m, 17500m, 22500m}, n ∈ {2, 5, 8},
U[a, b] ∈ {U[2.5,17.5],U[5,15],U[7.5,12.5]}, and y ∈ {500, 2500, 4500}.
We calculated the optimal mechanism’s expected cost as follows: For the given
problem parameters, costs are randomly generated according to the distribution F
for the incumbent suppliers. Given these costs, the optimal number of entrants
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are recruited and their costs are revealed; finally, the buyer pays the amount given
by (2.12). Because this calculation depends on the randomly-generated costs of
the incumbents, we run this simulation for 1,000,000 replications for that problem
instance and calculate the average. We call this average the optimal mechanism’s
expected cost for the given problem instance.
For these 81 scenarios, the optimal mechanism provides a relatively substantial
average net savings of 8.4 percent over the minimum expected cost of the no-test
and test (without reserve price) strategies, while it only provides an average net
savings of 1.9 percent over the minimum of the no-test and test with reserve price
strategies. In these calculations, we compare the optimal mechanism to the mini-
mum of the no-test and test strategies because the buyer will decide a priori which
strategy to use based on the problem instance’s parameters. Further, in these 81
scenarios the test with reserve price strategy provides an average net savings of 10.2
percent over the no-test strategy. Thus, when the buyer can use a reserve price, the
intuitive and easily-implementable test strategy provides the buyer with significant
savings and near-optimal results. The implications of this observation are important
to reiterate: The buyer can use an easily-implementable strategy with an auction
mechanism very familiar to practitioners that will provide average net savings of
over 10 percent compared to the commonly-used no-test strategy, and furthermore
this easily-implementable strategy only performs a mere 2 percent worse than the
optimal mechanism. For these reasons, we believe that the test with reserve price
strategy is a powerful sourcing mechanism for buyers.
Finally, we are interested in further exploring when the test with reserve price
strategy performs well and when it performs poorly compared to the optimal mecha-
nism. To this end, we vary the problem parameters beyond the aforementioned 81 in-
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stances. Once again, we use the example from §2.3.3 as a base case, where the default
parameter values were F ∼ U[$5, $15], Q = 50,000, y = 2,500, k(m) = $17,500m,
and n = 5.
First, the (constant) marginal cost of recruiting an entrant was varied from $2,000
to $160,000: Figure 2.5 shows that the net savings of the optimal mechanism over
the minimum of the no-test and test with reserve price strategies is increasing and
then decreasing in the recruitment cost. For extremely low recruitment costs, the
buyer will use the no-test strategy and recruit a large number of entrants prior to
holding an auction; likewise, under the optimal mechanism the buyer will (most
likely) recruit many entrants after viewing the incumbents’ costs. However, as the
recruitment cost increases the value of viewing the incumbents’ costs increases until
a certain point, after which the value decreases because the buyer will be less inclined
to recruit entrants due to the recruitment cost. We note that the slight “noise” in
the graph (and subsequent graphs) is due to the numerical calculation via simulation
of the optimal mechanism’s expected cost, as described above.
Second, the number of incumbent suppliers was varied from 2 to 30. Figure 2.6
shows that the net savings of the optimal mechanism increases and then decreases
in the number of incumbents. Using similar intuition from the recruitment cost
case, for very small and large n, the buyer’s recruitment decision hinges less on the
incumbents’ cost information; the buyer will be more inclined to recruit a lot (in
the case of very small n) or few (in the case of large n) entrants regardless of the
cost information, so the value of the optimal mechanism with respect to the test and
no-test strategies decreases.
The width of the suppliers’ cost distribution (originally U[$5,$15]) was varied
while holding the midpoint of the cost distribution constant at $10 – the widest cost
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Figure 2.5: Buyer’s net savings as a function of the constant marginal recruitment cost.
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Figure 2.6: Buyer’s net savings as a function of the number of incumbent suppliers.
distribution studied was U[$0,$20] and the narrowest was U[$9.4,$10.6]. Figure 2.7
shows that the optimal mechanism’s net savings grow at a decreasing rate as the
width of the suppliers’ cost distribution increases; as the variability of the incum-
bents’ costs increase, the value of being able to view the incumbents’ cost information
without having to allocate any quantity to incumbents increases due to the increased
uncertainty in cost.
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Figure 2.7: Buyer’s net savings as a function of the cost distribution’s width.
2.4 Extensions
2.4.1 Other Auction Mechanisms
We studied the open-bid descending-price auction format due to its prevalence in
industry, the intuitive nature of its mechanics, and the attractive simplicity of the
suppliers’ optimal bidding strategy (as proved in Proposition II.1). However, there
are a variety of different auction formats that could be used in lieu of the open-bid
descending-price auction.
Another auction format that is studied in the literature and also used in practice
is the first-price sealed-bid auction. Unfortunately this auction format is generally
intractable analytically for our test-strategy setting due to bidder asymmetry resul-
tant from bidders’ belief updating: Suppose an incumbent supplier wins the test
auction at a clearing price of x. The buyer then decides how many entrant suppliers
to recruit (say m∗) to compete against this winning incumbent supplier in the second
auction for the remaining Q − y units. The second auction will then be an auction
with ex ante asymmetric bidders. Namely, each supplier is aware that at least one
of the other suppliers has a different cost distribution: Given the number of entrants
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that the buyer recruits and the opening price (i.e. the reserve price) of the second
auction, the entrant suppliers can update their belief regarding the incumbent’s cost.
In general, an equilibrium bidding strategy cannot be found in such asymmetric
first-price sealed-bid auctions: Hartline et al. (2014) note that when “the agents’ val-
ues for the item are non-identically distributed, analytically solving for equilibrium
is notoriously difficult” while many others have confirmed the same (see e.g., Le-
brun (1991), Maskin and Riley (2000b)). There are a variety of papers that examine
the two-bidder case and find equilibrium bidding strategies for the two asymmetric
bidders (e.g., Mares and Swinkels (2014), Plum (1992), Lebrun (1991), Maskin and
Riley (2000a)). Of course, in our case there may be more than two bidders. Lebrun
(1999) finds positive results for the n bidder case where suppliers’ cost distributions
have supports equal to the same interval. This is not the case in our setting, as the
winning incumbent supplier’s cost distribution will have support on [a, x] while the
entrant suppliers’ cost distribution will have support on [a, b]. Finally, the case clos-
est to our model — where all bidders except one have the same valuation probability
measure — was numerically examined by Marshall et al. (1994). However, to our
knowledge no analytical results exist for this case. The same applies for the reverse
Dutch auction (whereby a price clock rises until a bidder ends the auction by accept-
ing the contract), as this format is strategically equivalent to a first-price sealed-bid
auction. The reverse Dutch auction is the other auction format the authors have
seen used in practice.
Regardless of these intractability issues, for these other auction formats used in
practice the following result generalizes Proposition II.3, which described the buyer’s
preference between the test and no-test strategies. To account for the role of belief up-
dating during the test strategy, we will assume the buyer has discretion over whether
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to announce the number of entrants she recruits for the second auction, whether to
announce an opening bid for the second auction, etc., as such announcements reveal
information that the entrants could use when updating their beliefs.
Proposition II.5. If the buyer uses sealed-bid first-price or reverse Dutch auctions
instead of open-bid descending-price auctions, then Proposition II.3 goes through as
before.
Finally, we note that the relatively small optimality gap (1.9% net savings in
our numerical study) between the second-price open-bid auction formats and the
optimal mechanism studied in §2.3 should reassure practitioners that the use of other
contracting mechanisms would provide at most minimal savings over our proposed
strategies.
2.4.2 Test Auction Strategy with Non-Independent Costs
We have emphasized the buyer’s opportunities for cost savings by using a test
auction strategy that allows the buyer to gain more information regarding incum-
bent suppliers’ costs before making a recruitment decision. The preceding analysis
assumed a private values framework, where suppliers’ costs are independent and
identically distributed according to cumulative distribution F with probability dis-
tribution f . Further, the cost distribution F is known to all suppliers and the buyer.
Thus, in our model the incumbent cost information gathered in the test auction
does not influence the buyer’s belief regarding the entrant suppliers’ costs. However,
there may be certain situations where this is not the case; the buyer may be able to
update her belief on the entrant suppliers’ cost distribution based on the incumbent
suppliers’ bid-down-to levels in the first test auction. For example, all suppliers may
share similar costs for things like commodity input prices or shipping/freight costs.
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Thus, suppose the buyer has an initial belief that the suppliers’ cost distribution is
F , and to update her belief after the test auction, the buyer refines her belief to the
distribution F (·|b1, b2, . . . , bn−1) with density f(·|b1, b2, . . . , bn−1), where bi represents
the ith drop-out bid (i.e., the data the buyer observes) in the test auction.
In our original model we showed that incumbents had a dominant strategy of re-
maining in an auction until either winning or reaching their true cost. This bidding
strategy was the bidders’ best response to the buyer’s recruitment strategy, where
the number of recruited entrants increases in the test auction’s clearing price. How-
ever, in the setting where the buyer updates her belief on the underlying supplier
cost distribution, things become more complex. In such a case, even if the incum-
bents bid down to their true cost, the buyer’s recruiting strategy need not have the
same property as before. In fact, the number of entrants the buyer recruits could
conceivably be decreasing in the test auction clearing price. For example, imagine a
case where the clearing price of the auction is high, but the buyer’s updated belief
confirms that an entrant supplier will be unlikely to have lower costs than the clear-
ing price of the test auction. Even though the clearing price is high, the buyer will
recruit fewer entrant suppliers than she might under an alternative scenario where
the clearing price is low but the buyer anticipates that entrant suppliers will provide
a cost savings. In the context of this example, one can see how incumbent suppliers
may want to alter their bidding strategy to influence the buyer’s recruitment deci-
sion. Therefore, to ensure that incumbents still find it optimal to bid aggressively in
the test auction, the buyer needs to add bigger “teeth” to her auction policy: She
promises to only allow the test auction winner to participate in the second auction.2
Under this more stringent policy, the incumbent bidders can be shown to have a
2By contrast, despite being mild, this assumption was not required in §2.3.1–2.3.3 so we did not impose it there.
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dominant strategy of remaining in the auction until either winning or reaching their
true cost. We also note that, unlike before, the buyer’s recruitment strategy need
not depend on just the test auction’s clearing price; indeed, one can easily see that
the buyer’s recruitment policy depends on her updated belief about the underlying
cost distribution, F (·|b1, b2, . . . , bn−1), which would in general depend on the drop-
out bids of the incumbents that the buyer observes in the test auction. The following
result formalizes these insights.
Proposition II.6. Suppose that under the test strategy the buyer only allows incum-
bent suppliers awarded units in the test auction to compete with entrant suppliers in
the second auction. Then, when the buyer can update her belief about the suppliers’
cost distribution:
(i) Suppliers in an auction will remain in it until either the price reaches their true
cost or they win the auction, whichever happens first.
(ii) Under the test strategy, the optimal number of suppliers to recruit, m∗T , is a
function of the drop-out bids of the n − 1 incumbent suppliers who do not win the
first test auction, which is equal to their per-unit costs: X(2:n), X(3:n), . . . , X(n:n).
Unlike Proposition II.1, which stated that for our original model that the number
of entrants the buyer recruits is solely dependent on the clearing price of the first
auction, we note that here the drop-out bids of the n − 1 incumbent suppliers who
do not win the test auction influence m∗T under the case of information updating.
This evidences an additional benefit of using a test auction when the buyer updates
her belief about the cost distribution: In addition to refining her knowledge of the
relative cost differences of the incumbents, the buyer learns about the underlying cost
distribution of the suppliers. But as before, the primary benefit of the test auction
still stems from reducing the buyer’s exposure to relatively high-cost incumbent
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suppliers.
The reserve price result from §2.3.2 no longer applies when the buyer updates her
belief of the suppliers’ cost distribution. Although Proposition II.2 states that the
buyer recruits the same number of entrants regardless of the test auction clearing
price’s origin, under the case of cost distribution updating the buyer may make
different recruitment decisions based on whether an incumbent supplier or the pre-
announced reserve price determines the clearing price of the test auction. The list
of the drop-out bids of the incumbent suppliers will differ between the two cases,
allowing different updates to the buyer’s beliefs; obviously, if the buyer has different
beliefs under the two cases, she may also recruit a different number of entrants.
In spite of these interesting differences, we conclude by noting that the com-
parative statics insights from Proposition II.3 continue to hold under the case of
information updating.
Proposition II.7. When the buyer updates her beliefs about the suppliers’ cost distri-
bution given the drop-out bids from the test auction according to F (·|b1, b2, . . . , bn−1)
and only allows the incumbent supplier (if any) who is awarded units in the test
auction to compete with entrant suppliers in the second auctions, then Proposi-
tion II.3 holds as before, with the following change: In part (i)(d), the buyer’s ex
ante and updated beliefs are given by f˜(x) = f(x+∆
α
) and f˜(x|b1, b2, . . . , bn−1) =
f(x+∆
α
| b1+∆
α
, b2+∆
α
, . . . , bn−1+∆
α
) with ∆ ∈ R and α ∈ R+, respectively.
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we have addressed a fundamental question in sourcing that has
received surprisingly little attention in the literature to date: How does a buyer who
already has a set of suppliers she has worked with in the past balance the cost of
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recruiting even more suppliers against the (uncertain) savings that she would accrue
by doing so? The key question we address is whether it is better for the buyer to
immediately recruit more suppliers and auction off the contract or first run a test
auction to gain a better understanding of the incumbent suppliers’ costs for the new
contract and use that information to assess how many more suppliers to recruit.
It is natural for buyers to want to test the market by contracting out a portion of
their total purchase quantity. Therefore, we believe our paper makes a practical
contribution to the sourcing literature by providing a framework for characterizing
buyers’ test auction strategies. Further, we show that the test strategy is especially
beneficial for the buyer as the minimum order quantity or the cost distribution’s
variance decreases, or the recruitment cost or number of incumbents increases. We
show that these results apply to a variety of auction formats (e.g., sealed-bid first-
price and Dutch auctions) even though such auctions result in bidding strategies
that are much more difficult to analyze and thus provide additional challenges for
implementation.
Additionally, we analyzed how the buyer can incorporate a reserve price into her
procurement strategy. We provide a natural way to model the outside option through
the buyer’s ability to recruit new suppliers. Our analysis of the reserve price is of
practical importance because reserve prices are ubiquitous in sourcing, and unlike
past papers in the literature, our paper endogenizes the reserve price based on the
actual costs that the firm would have to incur to recruit new bidders if its reserve
is not met. Although the auction literature commonly uses the notion of an outside
option cost (needed when setting a reserve price), such a cost is typically assumed to
be exogenous. For instance, the outside option cost associated with a procurement
auction’s reserve price is often taken to be some exogenous value that is described
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as the cost of in-house production. In contrast, we endogenize this cost — namely,
the cost of recruiting new suppliers and running a new auction. This is extremely
relevant in many real-life situations. In practice, many buyers we have dealt with
(including the buyer described in the Introduction) need to procure items that they
are not capable of producing themselves. The buyer relies on outside suppliers for
production, a fact which she must carefully consider when setting, say, a reserve price.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to inform this decision by endogenizing the
cost of recruiting new suppliers and re-running an auction.
Finally, our numerical results indicate that the test with reserve price strategy
performs nearly as well as the optimal mechanism under a wide variety of scenarios.
Further, although the optimal mechanism can be extremely difficult to implement in
practice, the test strategy is an easily implementable strategy for buyers. Given that
costly new supplier recruitment is a key aspect of global supply chain management,
we believe our work is applicable in a wide variety of industrial settings, and can
spur future studies on using market test processes (such as test auctions) to help
better manage recruitment costs.
2.6 Proofs for Chapter II
2.6.1 Proof of Proposition II.1
No-test. The dominant bidding strategy result follows from Krishna (2002). Since
the marginal cost of recruiting a supplier is nondecreasing (as k(m) is increasing
convex), to show convexity of total cost in mN it suffices to show that the expected
per-unit purchase price is decreasing discrete convex in the number of recruited sup-
pliers. This in turn is implied by regularity; to see this, take the auction’s expected
per-unit clearing price, a+
∫ b
a
(1−F (s))n+mNds+∫ b
a
(n+mN)F (s)(1−F (s))n+mN−1ds,
and integrate the last term by parts and then differentiate with respect to mN twice.
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Test. We first characterize the buyer’s “best response” m∗T under the supposition
that suppliers remain in an auction until either winning or reaching their true cost.
We then show that given the buyer’s strategy the supposed supplier strategy indeed
constitutes an equilibrium.
Let the outcome of the test auction be denoted by X(2:n) = x. For the second
auction, let E[MBm(x)] denote the expected per-unit purchasing price when m − 1
entrants are recruited minus the same when m entrants are recruited — in other
words, the expected per-unit marginal decrease in purchase price resultant from
recruiting the mth entrant supplier. Let
ˆˆ
X represent the random variable following
distribution
ˆˆ
F (y) = F (y)/F (x) for y ∈ [a, x]. We can write
E[MBm(x)] = F (x)
[m−1∑
i=0
(
m− 1
i
)
F (x)i(1− F (x))m−1−i[E[ ˆˆX(2:i+1)]− E[ ˆˆX(2:i+2)]]
]
,
where E[ ˆˆX(2:1)] , x. The leading F (x) reflects the fact that the mth entrant has an
effect only if its cost lies below x, and the summation over i corresponds to i of the
other m− 1 entrants having a cost below x as well. Similarly, we can write
E[MBm+1(x)] =(1− F (x))E[MBm(x)]
+
(
F (x)
)2[m−1∑
i=0
(
m− 1
i
)
F (x)i(1− F (x))m−1−i[E[ ˆˆX(2:i+2)]− E[ ˆˆX(2:i+3)]]
]
≤E[MBm(x)]
where the inequality follows since E[ ˆˆX(2:i+1)]−E[ ˆˆX(2:i+2)] ≥ E[ ˆˆX(2:i+2)]−E[ ˆˆX(2:i+3)] by
regularity of
ˆˆ
F (which follows from regularity of F ). Since the supplier recruitment
cost is convex, the buyer’s expected total (recruitment plus second-auction purchase)
cost is discrete convex in m.
To prove that the buyer’s optimal number of entrants to recruit is nondecreasing
in the clearing price, we first establish the following lemma.
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Lemma II.8. The expected marginal benefit of adding the mth supplier is nonde-
creasing in x.
Proof of Lemma II.8 This can be seen using a sample path argument: Suppose
there are m− 1 entrants. Order the cost of the incumbent who won the test auction
and the m − 1 realizations of entrant costs such that x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤ xm. Now
consider adding an mth entrant with cost realization z. We will show that the
buyer’s marginal benefit does not decrease in the test auction clearing price x under
any sample path. We know that x1 ≤ x since the incumbent’s cost is at most x.
There are two cases to consider.
Case 1. x1 ≤ x ≤ x2 or m = 1. The buyer’s marginal benefit of recruiting the mth
entrant is
x− x1 if z ≤ x1 ≤ x, (2.13)
x− z if x1 ≤ z ≤ x, and (2.14)
0 if x1 ≤ x ≤ z. (2.15)
Now consider the case where the test auction clearing price is x′ > x. Under this
sample path, (2.13) becomes min{x′, x2}−x1, (2.14) becomes min{x′, x2}−z (where
if m = 1 we take x2 =∞), and (2.15) becomes a nonnegative quantity (as the second
auction’s clearing price cannot increase when the mth entrant is added). Thus, the
buyer’s marginal benefit of adding the mth entrant when the clearing price is x′ is
greater than or equal to her marginal benefit when the clearing price is x under all
sample paths where x1 ≤ x ≤ x2.
Case 2. x2 ≤ x. The buyer’s marginal benefit of recruiting the mth entrant is x2−x1
if z ≤ x1 ≤ x2; x2 − z if x1 ≤ z ≤ x2; and 0 if x1 ≤ x2 ≤ z. When the test auction
clearing price is x′ > x, the buyer’s marginal benefit is unchanged under all three
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cases.
In conclusion, for all sample paths, the buyer’s marginal benefit of adding the mth
entrant is nondecreasing in the clearing price of the test auction. As this holds for
any sample path, it must hold in expectation. 
This lemma implies that m∗T is nondecreasing in x. To see this, let m
∗
T be the
buyer’s optimal number of entrants to recruit given clearing price x. We will show
that the buyer prefers to recruit m∗T entrants over mT < m
∗
T entrants for any x
′ >
x. Let E[TBm(x)] ,
∑m
i=1 E[MBi(x)] denote the buyer’s total expected benefit of
recruiting m entrants given clearing price x. The optimality of m∗T at clearing price
x implies
E[TBm∗T (x)]− k(m∗T ) > E[TBmT (x)]− k(mT )
=⇒
m∗T∑
i=1
E[MBi(x)]− k(m∗T ) >
mT∑
i=1
E[MBi(x)]− k(mT )
=⇒
m∗T∑
i=mT+1
E[MBi(x)]− (k(m∗T )− k(mT )) > 0.
Finally, Lemma II.8 implies
∑m∗T
i=mT+1
E[MBi(x′)] ≥
∑m∗T
i=mT+1
E[MBi(x)] so
m∗T∑
i=mT+1
E[MBi(x′)]− (k(m∗T )− k(mT )) > 0
=⇒
m∗T∑
i=1
E[MBi(x′)]− k(m∗T ) >
mT∑
i=1
E[MBi(x′)]− k(mT )
=⇒ E[TBm∗T (x′)]− k(m∗T ) > E[TBmT (x′)]− k(mT )
and therefore the buyer’s optimal number of entrants to recruit is nondecreasing in
the clearing price.
We now address the supplier bidding strategy. Working backwards, in the second
auction, the result holds as it is analogous to a single auction. In the test auction, if
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supplier i remains in the auction at a price below his true cost xi, he will lose money
on any units he is awarded and can only make negative profit. If the supplier drops
out of the test auction at a price above his true cost xi, he loses the test auction and
cannot make more profit in the second auction than if he bid down to xi because
the number of entrants the buyer will recruit is nondecreasing in the outcome of the
first auction. In either case, the supplier would have been better off remaining in the
auction until winning or reaching his true cost, whichever happens first.
Note that the above analysis holds for any quantity auctioned off in the test
auction. That is, the incumbent cost information gleaned by the buyer in the test
auction is the same regardless of the quantity auctioned off in the test auction (as
long as that quantity is at least y, the minimum quantity needed to entice the
incumbents to participate in the auction). Thus, y is the optimal quantity for the
buyer to auction off in the test auction, since auctioning off more units does not
change the buyer’s information and would only possibly result in her paying more if
she winds up recruiting entrants for the second auction.
2.6.2 Proof of Proposition II.2
When the reserve price is met and the clearing price is x = min{r∗1, X(2:n)}, the
buyer’s optimal number of entrants to recruit for the second auction, m∗T , is the
minimizer of (2.3), i.e.,
m∗T = arg min
mT∈N
{
E[X(2:n+mT )|min{r∗1, X(2:n)} = x](Q− y) + k(mT )
}
. (2.16)
Now consider the test without reserve price strategy. When the clearing price of
the first auction is x′, the optimal number of entrants for the buyer to recruit, say
m∗
′
T , is the minimizer of (2.1), i.e.,
m∗
′
T = arg min
mT∈N
{
E[X(2:n+mT )|X(2:n) = x′](Q− y) + k(mT )
}
. (2.17)
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Note that the clearing prices of the test auctions in equations (2.16) and (2.17)
are x and x′, respectively. As the clearing price of the first auction is the starting bid
of the second auction, if x = x′, then E[min{x,X(2:n+mT )}|min{r∗1, X(2:n)} = x] =
E[X(2:n+mT )|X(2:n) = x′] and m∗T = m∗′T .
2.6.3 Proof of Proposition II.3
(i)(a). Although an increase in y does not affect the buyer’s cost under the no-
test strategy, it weakly increases her expected cost under any given sample path
using the test strategy. For y = 0, test is optimal as the buyer could achieve the
same expected cost as the no-test strategy by recruiting m∗N entrants regardless of
the outcome of the first test auction.
(i)(b). As discussed in Proposition II.1’s proof, the expected unit cost under the
no-test strategy is decreasing discrete convex in the number of recruited suppliers
and approaches a as n + m → ∞. As the marginal cost of recruiting an entrant is
nondecreasing, there must exist a n∗ such that m∗N = 0 ∀ n ≥ n∗. If m∗N = 0, the
test strategy is a weakly dominant strategy.
(i)(c). We model the new supplier recruitment cost growing proportionately larger
by letting a · k(m) denote the recruitment cost, and considering the constant a. As
k(1) > 0, there exists a constant, a, such that when a = a the buyer prefers the
test strategy because m∗N = 0, and the test strategy weakly dominates the no-test
strategy. Further, test will be preferred for all a > a as m∗N = 0 for all such a.
(i)(d). First we establish the following lemma:
Lemma II.9. Let the scaled distribution f˜ be such that f˜(x) = f(x/α). As α becomes
large (that is, the distribution is scaled up), the buyer prefers the no-test strategy.
Similarly, as α becomes small (that is, the distribution is scaled down), the buyer
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prefers the test strategy.
Proof of Lemma II.9. We show that scaling up (down) the distribution by α is
equivalent to scaling down (up) the recruitment cost function by α. Then the result
follows from part (i)(c).
Define scaled distribution F˜ (x) , F (x/α), and scaled recruitment cost function
k˜(m) , αk(m). Let X˜(i:j) represent the ith-lowest order statistic out of j draws from
the distribution F˜ . Then the buyer’s problem given by the parameters F˜ , k˜(m), Q,
y, and n can be written as follows. For the no-test strategy,
EN [cost|mN ] = E[X˜(2:n+mN )]Q+ k˜(mN)
= αE[X(2:n+mN )]Q+ α · k(mN) = α
(
E[X(2:n+mN )]Q+ k(mN)
)
. (2.18)
The analysis for the test strategy is analogous. Thus, the problem with scaled pa-
rameters f˜ and k˜(m) is equivalent to the original problem with all supplier and
recruitment costs scaled by α. 
Now consider the effect of shifting the distribution by ∆. A ∆-shift of the suppli-
ers’ cost distribution is represented by the distribution f˜ with f˜(x) = f(x + ∆). It
is trivial to show that such a shift will not change the buyer’s strategy preference —
it will simply decrease the expected cost of both strategies by ∆ ·Q.
Combining this result with Lemma II.9 completes the proof of (i)(d).
(ii). The test with reserve price strategy results in an expected cost that is less than
or equal to the buyer’s expected cost under the test with no reserve price strategy
as r1 = b is a feasible reserve price that results in the same expected cost as the test
with no reserve price strategy. Thus, if the test with no reserve price strategy has
an expected cost less than the no-test strategy, the test with reserve price strategy
will also have an expected cost less than the no-test strategy.
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2.6.4 Proof of Proposition II.4
We note that in applying the revelation principle, we suppose that all suppliers
(including all possible entrants) report their type at the outset of the mechanism.
One can think of each entrant’s report as being locked in a box that the buyer will
only open if she pays the associated cost to recruit that entrant. Given that the
revelation principle allows us to focus on direct mechanisms, incentive compatibility
constraint (2.8) can be stated as ui(xi) , maxsi{pi(si)− xiqi(si)}. By the envelope
theorem, this gives u′i(xi) = −qi(xi), which implies that ui(xi) = ui(b) +
∫ b
xi
qi(si)dsi.
Solving for pi(xi) gives
pi(xi) = ui(b) +
∫ b
xi
qi(si)dsi + xiqi(xi). (2.19)
It is easy to check (e.g., Lemma 2 in Myerson (1981)) that, if (2.19) determines
the payment rule, then qi nonincreasing implies that incentive compatibility con-
straint (2.8) holds. Similarly, if (2.19) determines the payment rule, then ui(b) ≥ 0
for all i implies that the individually rationality constraint (2.7) holds. Given
these observations, and the fact that integrating (2.19) over X gives EX [pi(X)] =
EX [ui(b) + ψ(Xi)Qi(X)], we can rewrite the buyer’s mechanism design problem
(2.6)–(2.10) as
min
Qi(x),mT (xI)
E
[
k(mT (X
I)) +
n+mT (X
I)∑
i=1
ui(b)+
n+mT (X
I)∑
i=1
ψ(Xi)Qi(Xi, X−i)
]
(2.20)
s.t. ui(b) ≥ 0 ∀i (2.21)
qi(·) nonincreasing ∀i (2.22)
n+mT (x
I)∑
i=1
Qi(xi, x−i) = Q ∀i, ∀x (2.23)
Qi(xi, x−i) ∈ {0, y, y + 1, . . . , Q}∀x,∀i. (2.24)
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Note that an optimal mechanism will have ui(b) = 0 for all i. We now establish the
following lemma.
Lemma II.10. The optimal number of entrants to recruit, m∗T (x
I), is nondecreasing
in the lowest-cost incumbent’s cost, xI(1:n), and constant in all other incumbents’ costs,
xI(2:n), x
I
(3:n), . . . , x
I
(n:n).
Proof of Lemma II.10 Since ψ(·) is increasing, the incumbent with the lowest
virtual cost will be the lowest-cost incumbent. Note that m∗T (x
I) is not affected
by the incumbents with costs xI(2:n), x
I
(3:n), . . . , x
I
(n:n) because they are “out of the
running” and Q∗i (xi, x−i) = 0 for these incumbents.
Similar to the proof of Proposition II.1, we must show (i) the buyer’s total ex-
pected payment plus recruitment cost is discrete convex in mT and (ii) the expected
marginal benefit of recruiting the mth entrant is nondecreasing in xI .
Let H be the distribution of ψ(·). Note that E[ψ(X(1:n+m))|xI(1:n)] =
∫ ψ(xI
(1:n)
)
0 (1−
H(x))mdx is decreasing discrete convex in m. Since the supplier recruitment cost
function is increasing convex in m, the buyer’s expected total (recruitment plus
purchase) cost is discrete convex in m. Next, note that the marginal reduction in
expected purchase cost from recruiting the mth entrant equals
E[ψ(X(1:n+m−1))|xI(1:n)]− E[ψ(X(1:n+m))|xI(1:n)] =
∫ ψ(xI
(1:n)
)
0
(1−H(x))m−1H(x)dx,
and the derivative of the right hand side with respect to xI(1:n) equals
(1−H(xI(1:n)))m−1H(xI(1:n)), which is positive. Thus, the buyer’s optimal number of
entrants to recruit is nondecreasing in xI(1:n). 
Having established this structural result on the recruitment rule, we next find the
optimal mechanism.
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Lemma II.11. Let the number of entrants recruited by the buyer as a function of xI
be given by (2.11) and let the allocation rule and payment rule, respectively, be given
by:
Q∗i (xi, x−i) =

Q if xi = x(1:n+m∗T (xI))
0 otherwise,
(2.25)
P ∗i (xi, x−i) =
∫ b
xi
Q∗i (ti, x−i)dti + xiQ
∗
i (xi, x−i). (2.26)
This constitutes an optimal mechanism.
Proof of Lemma II.11 Given a number of recruited entrant suppliers, mT (x
I),
the optimal mechanism will minimize the third term of (2.20) by awarding Q units
to the lowest virtual cost supplier, per (2.25). Furthermore, as m∗T (x
I) given in
(2.11) minimizes the buyer’s objective function given the realization of the incumbent
suppliers’ costs, xI , it must be optimal.
All that is left to verify are constraints (2.22)–(2.24). From (2.25) we see immedi-
ately that constraints (2.23) and (2.24) hold. We now show that qi is nonincreasing
(constraint (2.22)). Suppose i is an entrant supplier. Since supplier i’s report only
affects the buyer’s allocation decision (per (2.25)), which is to give the contract to
the lowest-cost bidder, clearly entrant i can not improve its allocation probability
(increase qi) by reporting a higher cost. Next suppose i is an incumbent supplier.
For any number of entrants recruited by the buyer, supplier i’s quantity allocation
is nonincreasing in his cost report per (2.25). Moreover, the quantity allocation
per (2.25) is nonincreasing in the number of recruited entrants he competes against.
Since this number, m∗T , is nondecreasing in supplier i’s report by Lemma II.10, we
must have that supplier i cannot increase his allocation probability by reporting a
higher cost. In summary, the purchase quantity rule qi is nonincreasing in xi for all
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i, so the mechanism is incentive compatible.
Given Q∗i (xi, x−i), the optimal payment rule can be written as P
∗
i (xi, x−i) =∫ b
xi
Q∗i (ti, x−i)dti +xiQ
∗
i (xi, x−i). As this mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility,
individual rationality, and the quantity constraints, it is an optimal direct mecha-
nism. 
To complete the proof of Proposition II.4, we now show that the payment rule
(2.26) can be equivalently written as (2.12).
First, equation (2.26) can be written as
P ∗i (xi, x−i|xi < xj∀j 6= i) =
∫ b
xi
Q∗i (ti, x−i)dti + xi ·Q (2.27)
Note that Q∗i (ti, x−i) = Q if ti = x(1:n+m∗T (x˜I)), and note that m
∗
T (x˜
I) may not
necessarily equal m∗T (x
I) for all ti: If the winning supplier is an incumbent and
ti > xi, m
∗
T (x˜
I) ≥ m∗T (xI) as m∗T is nondecreasing in xI(1:n). Finally, note that
Q∗i (ti, x−i) = 0 for all ti > x(2:n+m∗T (xI)). Thus equation (2.27) becomes
P ∗i (xi, x−i|xi < xj∀j 6= i) =
∫ x
(2:n+m∗
T
(xI ))
xi
Q∗i (ti, x−i)dti + xi ·Q
=
∫ x
(2:n+m∗
T
(xI ))
xi
(1− F (ti))(m∗T (x˜I)−m∗T (xI)) ·Qdti + xi ·Q
which is equal to Proposition II.4’s payment rule given by (2.12).
2.6.5 Proof of Proposition II.5
(i)(a). Regardless of the suppliers’ bidding strategies, for y = 0 the test strategy
can do no worse in expectation than the no-test strategy: Under the test strategy,
a feasible strategy is to always recruit m∗N entrants and not use the outcome of the
test auction as a cap on the second auction, which achieves the expected cost of the
no-test strategy.
(i)(b). In Proposition II.3(i)(b), we found that the per-unit expected cost under the
no-test strategy is decreasing discrete convex in the number of incumbent suppliers
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and approaches a as n → ∞ for the open-bid second-price auction. Under the
no-test strategy, the bidders are ex ante symmetric so by the revenue equivalence
theorem, the buyer will pay the same expected cost (up to a constant) under the
open-bid second-price, sealed-bid first-price, and Dutch auction formats under no-
test. Thus, as in Proposition II.3(i)(b), as the marginal cost of recruiting an entrant
is nondecreasing, there must exist a n∗ such that m∗N = 0 ∀ n ≥ n∗ for these auction
formats. If m∗N = 0, the test strategy is a weakly dominant strategy. This is because
the buyer could replicate the outcome of the no-test auction by announcing that she
will always recruit zero entrants after the test auction.
(i)(c). The proof of Proposition II.3(i)(c) continues to hold, where as in part (i)(b)
above we use the fact that test weakly dominates no-test when m∗N = 0.
(i)(d). The proof of Proposition II.3(i)(d) holds with the following change: Let CP
and C˜P represent the clearing price of a sealed-bid first-price or Dutch auction when
suppliers have cost distribution F and F˜ , respectively. Then replacing X(2:n+mN ) and
X˜(2:n+mN ) with CP and C˜P, respectively, provides the result.
(ii). The proof of Proposition II.3(ii) continues to hold.
2.6.6 Proof of Proposition II.6
(i). Consider a supplier’s bidding strategy under the no-test strategy and in
the second auction of the test strategy. It is still a weakly dominant strategy for
a supplier to remain in the auction until the price reaches their true cost for the
same reasons as in Proposition II.1. Now consider the first test auction. Due to the
restriction that only the incumbent supplier who is awarded units in the test auction
can compete in the second auction, incumbent suppliers will not remove themselves
from the test auction while the price is greater than their cost because they will
lose the auction and will not be considered in future auctions. Further, incumbent
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suppliers will not stay in the auction when the price is less than their cost because
they would make negative profit if they win the first auction, and the first auction’s
clearing price serves as a cap on the unit price of the second auction.
(ii). Following the first test auction, the buyer aims to minimize her expected
cost by choosing to recruit m∗T entrant suppliers, where m
∗
T is such that
m∗T = arg min
mT∈N
{
E[X˜(2:n+mT )|X(2:n), X(3:n), . . . , X(n:n)](Q− y) + k(mT )
}
where X˜ has cumulative distribution function F˜ , which represents the buyer’s up-
dated belief regarding the suppliers’ cost distribution based on the realizations of
the n− 1 incumbent suppliers’ drop-out costs, X(2:n), X(3:n), . . . , X(n:n). Thus, m∗T is
a function of the drop-out bids of the incumbent suppliers that do not win the first
test auction.
2.6.7 Proof of Proposition II.7
(i)(a). The proof of Proposition II.3(i)(a) continues to hold as the per-unit ex-
pected cost under the test strategy decreases in the number of suppliers regardless
of the true distribution of F .
(i)(b). As suppliers bid down to their true cost (see Proposition II.6) and as the
true distribution of F is regular, the expected clearing price is decreasing discrete
convex in the number of bidders. Thus, the proof of Proposition II.3(i)(b) continues
to hold.
(i)(c). The proof of Proposition II.3(i)(c) continues to hold.
(i)(d). The proof of Proposition II.3(i)(d) applies to the information updating case
with one supplementation to Lemma II.9. Define the scaled distribution F˜ (x), scaled
recruitment cost function k˜(m), and X˜(i:j) as before. Let the n−1 incumbent drop-out
bids be binc , [b1, b2, . . . , bn−1] (where inc stands for incumbent) and let the scaled ver-
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sion of the n−1 incumbent drop-out bids be b˜inc , binc/α = [b1/α, b2/α, . . . , bn−1/α].
Then, for any recruitment rule, the test strategy’s equivalent to (2.18) is given by
ET [cost] = E[X˜(2:n)]y + Eb˜inc
[
E[X˜(2:n+mT (˜binc))|˜binc](Q− y) + k˜(mT (˜binc))
]
= αE[X(2:n)]y + Ebinc
[
αE[X(2:n+mT (binc))|binc](Q− y) + α · k(mT (binc))
]
= α
(
E[X(2:n)]y + Ebinc
[
E[X(2:n+mT (binc))|binc](Q− y) + k(mT (binc))
])
.
(ii). The proof of Proposition II.3(ii) continues to hold.
CHAPTER III
Entrant Cost Uncertainty and Pre-Auction Learning:
Theory
3.1 Introduction
Manufacturing firms spend a significant amount of money procuring goods and
services from outside suppliers in order to make their end products. According to
a July 2013 CAPS Research report, industrial manufacturing firms’ spend totaled
over 54% of their revenues (CAPS Research, 2013). As a result, sourcing is often
an area where buyers are interested in finding significant cost reductions through
the promotion of competition between suppliers. Much of the sourcing literature
addresses different sourcing mechanisms and considerations when a buyer is looking
to lower her costs to source a good or service from a pool of ex ante symmetric
suppliers. In practice, however, an incumbent supplier often has an informational
advantage over a supplier who has not produced the good or service for the buyer.
In this chapter, we study such a scenario through both theoretical and experimental
lenses.
The specific scenario is as follows: A buyer has an established contract with a
supplier for a specific good or service. We call the supplier that is currently fulfilling
the contract the incumbent supplier. The contract for this item is coming up for
bid; for example, in a production context a typical contract might last for a few
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years’ supply of parts. An entrant supplier approaches the buyer, expressing an
interest in winning business from the buyer. The buyer, who would like to gain price
concessions from the incumbent or a lower price from the entrant than what she is
currently paying the incumbent, would like to put the contract up for competitive
bid and have the two suppliers compete for the business.
This is a natural and common occurrence in practice. In addition, when an
incumbent faces an entrant in a competitive bidding event, interesting dynamics
result from how well each party can predict their cost of fulfilling the buyer’s contract.
This interplay is especially relevant because a supplier’s cost estimate is a critical
input when it decides how much to bid for a contract.
The incumbent supplier — who has fulfilled the previous contract — has a good
sense of her costs to continue supplying the good or service to the buyer due to her
familiarity with the product. For example, the incumbent supplier may have already
undergone extensive training with the buyer’s engineers, determined her labor cost,
secured licenses and certifications, or met stringent governmental regulations that
are required to supply the good or service. Specifically, this knowledge results in the
incumbent supplier’s ability to calculate her own cost associated with the contract.
By contrast, the entrant supplier does not have an at-the-ready prediction of his
costs. For example, the contract might entail delivery schedules to specific buyer
locations which would necessitate the entrant to consider these requirements and
related infrastructure implications, and use this information to estimate his costs. Or,
the contract up for bid might be for a non-standardized part with specific tolerances
and the entrant might need to experiment with his existing production equipment
to determine how costly it will be to produce the item, or to decide if he needs to
purchase new equipment, which would require gathering of pricing information from
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equipment vendors. There are myriad additional possibilities, such as the cost of
understanding and complying with any specific government regulations that might
apply to the good or service. In short, the incumbent’s previous experience may
serve as a significant informational advantage over an entrant supplier who has not
previously produced the good or service for the buyer.
While the entrant initially faces a cost information disadvantage, we consider the
case where this uncertainty can be resolved by the entrant. For example, the entrant
could engage in the initial phases of production planning in order to estimate his
per-unit production cost of a complex part (see Garc´ıa-Crespo et al. (2011) for an
overview of different cost estimation methods in manufacturing). Or, the entrant
could hire an outside consultant to guide him in understanding the government reg-
ulations and costs involved with producing a part whose inputs are unusually toxic.
However, while the entrant has the ability to erode the incumbent’s cost informa-
tion advantage by learning about his own costs, he must also weigh the expense of
acquiring this information without a promise of winning the buyer’s contract. This
results in the entrant supplier facing a trade-off: He can invest costly effort to learn
about his costs prior to competing with the incumbent for a contract to supply the
good or service to the buyer, or he can initially bypass the investment (the “learning
fee”) and compete against the incumbent while at an informational disadvantage.
This leads to our first research question:
Research Question 1: When does the entrant supplier find it preferable to resolve
his cost uncertainty prior to bidding?
To investigate this research question, we analyze the entrant’s learning strategy
for different types of unknown costs. Our model reflects the fact that some costs
can be the same for both the incumbent and the entrant — so-called common cost
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components, such as raw material costs or government taxes and inspection/licensing
costs — while others are specific to each supplier — so-called idiosyncratic cost
components, such as labor costs, utilization rates, or efficiency. One or the other
might be easier for the entrant to estimate: For example, for a plastic injection
molded part it might be easy to estimate the raw material resin cost (which is largely
a function of part weight), but more difficult to estimate the production efficiency if
the part has a complicated shape. Conversely, if the plastic part involves highly toxic
inputs but is simple to manufacture, the government regulation costs may be difficult
to estimate compared to the production efficiency, which is more straightforward.
We find that the entrant adopts a threshold learning fee policy when deciding
whether to resolve his cost uncertainty prior to bidding. The threshold is independent
of the entrant’s common cost realization — he will choose to learn prior to bidding
if the fee is less than a single threshold irrespective of the known common cost.
However, the entrant’s learning fee threshold is a function of his idiosyncratic cost.
When the entrant knows his idiosyncratic cost but not the common cost, we find
that the entrant is most likely to learn prior to bidding when he has a low-to-medium
idiosyncratic cost realization; in such a case, the entrant highly values learning his
unknown cost prior to competing against the incumbent.
Our next research question further builds off the intuition behind the entrant’s
learning decision by addressing the buyer’s perspective and preference for the en-
trant’s learning decision. Intuitively, a buyer could make it easier for the entrant to
learn about his costs. For example, the buyer could provide a particularly compre-
hensive RFQ, which not only details the product specifications but also lists several
possible methods of production. Of course, creating such a document requires the
buyer to devote resources to flesh out these details, for which the buyer incurs a cost.
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Thus, the buyer also faces a trade-off: The buyer may be able to increase competition
between the incumbent and entrant by making it easier for the entrant to resolve his
cost information disadvantage, but providing such assistance comes at a cost to the
buyer. This results in:
Research Question 2: Does the buyer benefit from making it easier for the entrant
to resolve his cost uncertainty prior to bidding, and if so, when?
We find that the buyer-optimal learning fee is a straightforward calculation in the
unknown idiosyncratic cost case as the buyer is able to predict the entrant’s learning
decision based solely on the learning fee; the buyer will reduce the entrant’s learning
fee until the entrant is indifferent between learning and not learning unless the buyer’s
cost of fee reduction is too expensive. However, the buyer’s choice of learning fee
is much more complex in the unknown common cost case as the entrant’s learning
decision depends on his private information. The buyer must set the learning fee
without knowledge of the entrant’s threshold learning fee and thus cannot predict
the entrant’s actions for a given learning fee reduction.
Finally, we study the entrant’s bidding and learning strategies and the implications
for the buyer in a laboratory experiment and compare the findings to the theoretical
predictions. Thus, we translated our model to a controlled laboratory setting in
order to understand how these findings might actually play out in practice:
Research Question 3: To what extent are the theoretical predictions for our model
replicated by actual behavior in a controlled laboratory experiment?
In the laboratory study, subjects play the role of the entrant supplier and make
the corresponding learning and bidding decisions. The computer automates the role
of the incumbent supplier. We find that subjects use a threshold-based learning
strategy, but their threshold tends to be lower than the optimal threshold. As a
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result, subjects learn prior to the auction less often than theory predicts. Further,
when subjects do not learn prior to bidding, they bid aggressively (i.e., less than the
optimal bid) for most cost realizations; they bid greater than the optimal bid for
extremely low idiosyncratic cost realizations when they do not know the common
cost prior to bidding. The subjects’ choices result in an important implication for
the buyer: In our experiment, the costly reduction of the learning fee does not have a
statistical impact on the buyer’s costs. This suggests that buyers need not expend as
much costly effort to make it easier for entrant suppliers to learn as theory predicts.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In §3.2, we summarize
the related literature that addresses aspects of this research problem from both the
theoretical and experimental viewpoints. In §3.3 we outline the model and discuss the
incumbent supplier’s bidding strategy. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 provide theoretical results
for two different cases: First, we study the case where the entrant’s information
disadvantage stems from an idiosyncratic cost, while §3.5 addresses the case where
the unknown cost is a common cost that is equal for both suppliers. In Chapter IV,
we transition to studying the fourth research question in a controlled laboratory
experiment and provide conclusions.
3.2 Literature Review
Our analysis addresses (i) the buyer’s choice of whether to lower the learning fee
and (ii) the entrant’s subsequent learning strategy for a cost model that combines
idiosyncratic and common cost components. In our model, it is costly for the buyer
to reduce the entrant’s learning fee due to the effort, time, and resources that are
required to provide a more-detailed RFQ or other assistance. To our knowledge, we
are the first to model the buyer’s costly ability to control the entrant’s learning fee.
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By contrast, the literature that addresses the auctioneer’s ability to release informa-
tion to bidders assumes that it is a costless process for the auctioneer. For example,
Eso˝ and Szentes (2007) study the optimal auction when a seller can costlessly re-
lease signals of the buyers’ valuations to the bidders and finds that the seller will
fully reveal this information. Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007) study the optimal
auction when the seller costlessly determines the structure (precision) of the bidder’s
value information. The canonical work in this stream, Milgrom and Weber (1982),
establishes the “linkage principle,” which states that the auctioneer should always
reveal available information in auctions with affiliated values. In our setting the
buyer must balance the cost of making it easier for the entrant to learn cost infor-
mation with the benefits provided by a reduced fee. Due to the this trade-off, the
buyer does not necessarily choose to make it easier for the entrant to resolve his cost
uncertainty. Moreover, in our model the buyer can prefer that the entrant does not
learn, even if it would have been costless for the buyer to reveal information to the
entrant. This occurs when the entrant’s idiosyncratic cost (rather than the common
cost) is unknown. Nonetheless, there is evidence that it may be advantageous for
the buyer to assist the disadvantaged bidders even when such assistance is costly
— for example, Rothkopf et al. (2003) finds that subsidizing bidders at an economic
disadvantage can lower the buyer’s expected cost. However, the entrant in our model
has an information disadvantage.
Others have studied different ways the auctioneer can influence a bidder’s learning
strategy. For a single agent setting, Cre´mer et al. (1998a) and Cre´mer et al. (1998b)
study how a principal can design a mechanism to induce the optimal amount of
learning by the agent, and Shi (2012) extends this concept to multiple agents. These
papers assume that the principal and the agent possess the same information about
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the agent’s valuation before the agent decides to learn. By contrast, we allow for
the realistic possibility that — even before learning — the agent can have superior
information about its own cost compared with the principal. As in our case, they
find that the agent chooses to learn if the cost is sufficiently low; however, in their
models the agent does not have a known cost realization in addition to the unknown
cost. Our model incorporates known costs and we find that the realization influences
the entrant’s learning decision in the known idiosyncratic cost case, while it does not
influence the entrant’s decision in the known common cost case. Further, Cre´mer
et al. (1998a) find that the principal would like to induce the agent to learn when the
learning cost is low; although we find that this is the case for the unknown common
cost case, we find the opposite result when there is an unknown idiosyncratic cost.
Our discussion of the entrant’s learning strategy fits in the costly information ac-
quisition literature. Previous research in the operations management and economics
fields have mainly focused on the common cost model, while we analyze the case
where the entrant’s total cost is the sum of a common cost and an idiosyncratic cost.
Chatterjee and Harrison (1988) study an information collection problem motivated
by the timber industry. They use a pure common values model and find equilibrium
learning and bidding strategies when bidders can make costly observations. Persico
(2000) finds that bidders choose to learn more information in first price auctions than
in second price auctions in a common values setting. However, neither of these papers
study the impact of a private cost component or allow the auctioneer to control the
learning fee. Hernando-Veciana (2009) studies information acquisition in a combined
idiosyncratic plus common value model where ex ante symetrically-informed bidders
make simultaneous learning decisions; in our model, an uninformed entrant competes
against an informed incumbent. Hernando-Veciana focuses on the implications for
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sealed- versus open-bid auctions and finds that bidders in open-bid auctions learn
less about common values and more about private values than in sealed-bid auc-
tions. Further, Hernando-Veciana’s paper does not allow the auctioneer to influence
the learning fee.
The costly information acquisition problem has also been studied under two re-
lated motivations. The research and development literature contains models where
suppliers can make pre-auction investments before formulating their bid. However,
in such papers (e.g., Tan (1992), Piccione and Tan (1996), and Arozamena and Can-
tillon (2004)) the investment allows the supplier to reduce their cost; that is, the
investment affects the supplier’s cost distribution. In contrast with these papers, we
focus on intrinsic uncertainty in the cost itself. McAfee and McMillan (1987), Levin
and Smith (1994), and Samuelson (1985) study auctions where bidders incur costs
to participate in the competition. In this entry fee literature, the bidder must pay
the fee to enter the auction; the entrant in our model can participate in the auction
if he does not pay the learning fee.
The behavioral literature also touches on certain aspects of our model; however,
to the best of our knowledge we are the first to experimentally study the entrant’s in-
formation acquisition problem in an auction setting. Kagel and Levin (2002) provide
an excellent overview of subjects’ bidding behavior in a variety of common-value auc-
tion settings. A fair amount of experimental literature has studied bidding behavior
in second price auctions. Avery and Kagel (1997) study second price common-value
auctions where one bidder has a private value advantage (i.e., the bidders have asym-
metric payoffs as one bidder has a known private value in addition to the common
value). They find that the disadvantaged bidder tends to bid much more aggressively
than the equilibrium bidding strategy. In our model, the entrant’s main disadvan-
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tage stems from his cost uncertainty, which can be resolved at a cost; further, the
entrant may face a cost advantage or disadvantage based on his idiosyncratic cost
realization.
In the private values setting, Cooper and Fang (2008) study bidding in private
value auctions where the subject receives noisy signals regarding the opponents’
valuations. They find that subjects tend to overbid (i.e., bid aggressively), albeit
by different amounts based on the signal. In our case, the subjects’ uncertainty
is caused by their knowledge of their own cost. Cantillon (2008) and Gu¨th et al.
(2005) address the case where bidders have asymmetrically-distributed valuation
distributions within a private values auction framework. However, these studies
do not allow the subject to resolve their uncertainty at a cost, which is a crucial
component of our experiment.
Kraemer et al. (2006) addresses costly learning in a non-auction setting. They
find that the subjects generally purchase too many information signals in a sequen-
tial decision-making model. By contrast, earlier work by Ro¨theli (2001) found that
subjects underestimate the value of information when they can sequentially learn
multiple pieces of possibly-correlated information. However, in our model we fo-
cus on learning in a competitive (auction) context, and we model the decision to
“purchase” information as a binary decision.
Finally, the behavioral operations management literature contains papers that
address learning in a sequential search setting. Bearden et al. (2006) and Palley and
Kremer (2014) study search and learning in a rank-based version of the secretary’s
problem, where the subject receives ordinal information regarding the value of an
item and must decide whether to either stop the search and keep the item or decline
the item. However, our model results in the entrant bidding based on his learning
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decision and cost information, and the entrant becomes perfectly informed if he
chooses to learn. In Chapter IV, we discuss other relevant experimental papers in
the context of our findings.
3.3 Model
We consider an incumbent supplier and an entrant supplier (supplier i and e,
respectively) competing to supply a contract to a buyer. The buyer will award the
contract via an open-bid, descending-price auction. In practice, this is often called a
“clock auction.” Each supplier is risk-neutral and has a linear production cost that
is the sum of two independent stochastic components: a common cost component
and an idiosyncratic cost component. Both suppliers have the same common cost
component c, which has cumulative distribution F with support [c, c]. For example,
the common cost may represent the cost of a commodity input, tooling, or obtaining
licenses and governmental approval to produce the item or service. The idiosyncratic
cost components of the incumbent and entrant are given by di ∼ Gi with support
[di, di] and de ∼ Ge with support [de, de], respectively. These idiosyncratic costs
are independent and may represent a combination of the labor, transportation, or
yield-dependent costs. Thus, the total production cost for the incumbent is c + di,
and the total production cost for the entrant is c + de. Let f , gi, and ge be the
corresponding probability distribution functions; we assume they are strictly positive
and continuous on their respective supports.
The incumbent knows the values of c and di through her experience as a supplier
to the buyer — perhaps the buyer is sourcing an item that she sourced from the
incumbent in the past or the incumbent made a previous generation or similar version
of the product. The buyer, however, is unaware of the incumbent’s costs. It is
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common in practice for a supplier to carefully guard its cost information from the
buyer. The buyer is aware of the cost distributions F , Gi, and Ge.
The entrant initially only knows one of his two costs (either the common cost
or his idiosyncratic cost): He must spend time and money on prototypes, design
specifications, financial calculations, consultant fees, and similar procedures to learn
the realization of the other cost. The entrant can learn the unknown cost realization
by paying a learning fee. The entrant’s learning fee to resolve his cost uncertainty is
initially equal to kc and kd in the unknown common cost and unknown idiosyncratic
cost cases, respectively. However, the buyer has the ability to reduce the learning fee
that the entrant ultimately incurs. Specifically, in the unknown common cost case the
buyer’s cost to set the common cost component’s learning fee equal to kc is α(kc−kc),
where kc ≥ kc is the default learning fee if the buyer does not adjust the fee (see
Figure 3.1(a)). In practice, setting the learning fee can involve releasing information
such as drawings, prototypes, and allowing access to the firm’s engineers. The buyer
may also expend time and money on making the item’s specifications more precise or
providing references to different production techniques for making the part. Here, α
is a parameter that represents how costly it is for the buyer to make it easier for the
entrant to learn – if α = 0, then it is free for the buyer to make the learning easier (for
example, he just releases information that he has already prepared), while if α = 1
the buyer must fully subsidize the kc − kc decrease in the common component’s
learning fee. Likewise, in the unknown idiosyncratic cost case the buyer’s cost to set
the idiosyncratic cost component’s learning fee equal to kd is β(kd − kd), where β
represents the fraction of the idiosyncratic cost learning fee decrease incurred by the
buyer (see Figure 3.1(b)). We restrict α and β to nonnegative values to capture the
fact that exerting effort is costly for the buyer.
68
c
Original 
learning fee
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α·(kc-kc)
_
(a) The buyer incurs a cost of α · (kc − kc) to
reduce the entrant’s common cost learning fee
from the default value of kc to kc.
d
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learning fee
d
Buyer 
reduces 
learning fee 
to this level
d d
Buyer pays 
β·(kd-kd)
_
(b) The buyer incurs a cost of β · (kd − kd) to
reduce the entrant’s idiosyncratic cost learning
fee from the default value of kd to kd.
Figure 3.1: Buyer’s reduction of the entrant’s learning fees.
Second, we assume that kc ≤ kc and kd ≤ kd; that is, the buyer cannot make it
more expensive for the entrant to learn his cost. It is best to think of the default
learning fees kc and kd as large values that represent the minimal required amount of
information needed by a supplier in order to participate in an auction. At the very
least, the buyer must provide an RFQ that details the specifications of the good or
service, expected delivery date, and similar necessary pieces of information. Thus,
the default learning fee corresponds to this minimum level of information required
by an entrant to bid. Finally, we assume that the buyer “sets” the final value of
the learning fee before the entrant supplier has to make any decisions; that is, the
buyer implicitly sets the learning fee when she announces the RFQ and provides
the corresponding information (e.g., drawings, prototypes, references) to the entrant
before the entrant decides whether to incur the learning fee.
Because di and de are independent, learning his idiosyncratic cost component
(de) does not give the entrant any additional information regarding the incumbent’s
idiosyncratic cost – he only knows the distribution of di. He may choose to learn
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or not learn a given piece of information prior to the auction. We assume that if
the entrant wins the auction without learning a piece of information, he has to incur
the cost of learning this information before supplying the item. This is because the
knowledge gained through learning c and de is necessary to produce the item to the
buyer’s specifications. For example, the entrant may need to negotiate pricing of
an input or commodity, refine production techniques for the product in question, or
obtain necessary permits or certifications prior to production.
Before proceeding with the analysis of the entrant’s learning strategies, note that
it is a weakly dominant strategy for the incumbent supplier to use bid-down-to-level
(drop-out bid) c+ di. Namely, it is optimal for the incumbent to stay in the auction
until the price reaches her true cost regardless of the entrant supplier’s actions (see,
e.g., Krishna (2002)).
3.4 Unknown Idiosyncratic Cost Case
In this section, we analyze the case where the entrant supplier’s cost information
disadvantage surrounds his idiosyncratic cost component, de. Prior to competing in
the auction against the incumbent, the entrant knows the common cost realization,
c, and his idiosyncratic cost distribution function, Ge. Such a situation is prevalent
in many industries where the common costs stem from commodities and widely-
available inputs. For example, it may be easy for the entrant supplier to estimate
the cost of raw materials necessary to produce the part given the metal recipe and
part weight (which constitutes a common cost). However, in such a case it may
be difficult for the buyer to know how easily the parts can be produced using his
current machinery, which obfuscates his idiosyncratic cost component. The entrant
can choose to learn his idiosyncratic cost component by paying the learning fee, kd,
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which is set by the buyer before the entrant’s learning decision is made.
If the entrant chooses to incur the learning fee prior to bidding, he learns de and
then competes in the auction. If the entrant wins the auction (i.e., if the incumbent
drops out of the auction first) then he supplies the good or service and is paid the
drop-out bid of the incumbent; if the entrant is the first to drop out of the auction,
the incumbent wins the contract and the entrant receives zero revenue.
If the entrant chooses not to learn de prior to competing in the auction, he must
prepare his bid-down-to-level based on his knowledge of c, Ge, and kd. If the entrant
wins the auction, he is paid the drop-out bid of the incumbent and incurs three costs
while supplying the good or service to the buyer: (1) the learning fee, kd, is incurred
because the knowledge that is gained through incurring this fee is necessary to pro-
duce the item to the buyer’s specifications (e.g., refining production techniques); (2)
his idiosyncratic cost, de, and (3) the common cost, c. Finally, if the entrant loses
the auction, he does not produce the item and receives zero revenue. This sequence
of events is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Buyer sets 
learning fee kd
Entrant 
makes 
learning 
decision
Auction
Entrant 
pays kd
and 
learns de Entrant’s 
revenue = 0
Entrant 
Wins
Learns
Does Not Learn
Auction
Entrant Loses
Entrant’s 
revenue = 
Incumbent’s 
drop-out bid
Entrant 
pays kd
and 
learns de
Entrant’s 
revenue = 
Incumbent’s 
drop-out bid
Entrant 
Wins
Figure 3.2:
The sequence of events when the entrant does not initially know his idiosyncratic cost
realization, de.
To analyze when it is optimal for the entrant to learn his idiosyncratic cost com-
ponent before the auction, we quantify the entrant’s expected profit as a function
of his learning decision. Similarly, we determine the buyer’s expected cost given the
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entrant’s learning decision as a step towards finding the buyer’s optimal learning fee
that is set at the outset of the procurement process. Throughout the remainder of
the chapter, we use the following notation when expressing the entrant’s profit and
bidding functions and the buyer’s expected cost function: Subscript c refers to the
case where the entrant knows the common cost (c) but not his idiosyncratic cost,
while subscript cd refers to the case where the entrant knows both his commmon and
idiosyncratic costs (c + de). In §3.5 we will use a subscript d to represent the case
where the entrant knows his idiosyncratic cost but not the common cost realization.
We can now express the entrant’s expected profit when he chooses to learn his
idiosyncratic cost prior to the auction, E[Πcd(bcd(c, de))] as a function of his bid
(bcd(c, de)), which only depends on his known costs (the common cost and his id-
iosyncratic cost realization):
E[Πcd(bcd(c, de))]
= −kd + Edi,de [c+ di − (c+ de)|c+ di ≥ bcd(c, de)] · Pr(c+ di ≥ bcd(c, de)). (3.1)
Note that the entrant’s bid affects his profit through the probability that the entrant
wins the auction and not his payment given the outcome of the auction. Similarly,
the entrant’s expected profit when he does not pay the learning fee prior to the
auction, E[Πc(bc(c))], is given by
E[Πc(bc(c))] = Edi [c+ di − (c+ E[de] + kd)|c+ di ≥ bc(c)] · Pr(c+ di ≥ bc(c)).
(3.2)
Here, we note an interesting consequence of the structure of the descending-price
open-bid auction format: Under a clock auction, the entrant’s bid simply determines
whether the entrant wins the auction; conditional on the outcome of the auction,
the entrant’s revenue and costs are independent of his own bid. To move towards
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determining the entrant’s learning strategy, we describe the entrant’s optimal bidding
strategies under both learning decisions.
Proposition III.1. Suppose the entrant knows the common cost, c. If the entrant
pays the learning fee kd to learn his idiosyncratic cost realization prior to the auction,
the entrant’s optimal bid-down-to-level is his total production cost, b∗cd(c, de) = c+de.
If the entrant does not pay the learning fee prior to the auction, the entrant’s optimal
bid-down-to-level is b∗c(c) = c+E[de] + kd, namely, his total expected production cost
plus the learning fee.
To summarize the two bidding strategies, this result states that the entrant bids
down to his total (expected) cost associated with producing the good or service
given that he wins the auction: When the entrant chooses to learn de prior to the
auction, the learning fee is “sunk” regardless of the outcome of the auction. As a
result, the entrant aims to maximize his expected profit given his production cost,
c + de, and bids down to that cost. We note that this bidding strategy is the same
as the incumbent’s bidding strategy. If the entrant chooses not to learn de prior to
the auction, his expected cost to produce the item given that he wins the auction
consists of the known common cost, his expected idiosyncratic cost, and the learning
fee that is incurred if he wins the auction (and not incurred if he loses the auction).
The entrant’s unknown cost is independent of the incumbent’s private information,
so the entrant’s optimal bidding strategy entails attempting to win the auction if and
only if the clearing price of the auction (i.e., the incumbent’s total cost) is greater
than his own total expected cost.
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3.4.1 Entrant’s Learning Decision
Given the entrant’s optimal bidding strategies, we now analyze when it is optimal
for the entrant to pay the learning fee prior to the auction. The entrant’s optimal
bid when he learns de is b
∗
cd(c, de) = c+ de, while his optimal bid is given by b
∗
c(c) =
c + E[de] + kd when the entrant chooses not to learn the idiosyncratic cost prior to
the auction. Incorporating b∗cd and b
∗
c into (3.1) and (3.2), respectively, results in the
entrant’s expected profit under both options:
E[Πcd] = −kd + Edi,de [di − de|di ≥ de] · Pr(di ≥ de)
= −kd + Edi,de [(di − de)+] (3.3)
E[Πc] = Edi [di − (E[de] + kd)|di ≥ E[de] + kd] · Pr(di ≥ E[de] + kd)
= Edi [(di − (E[de] + kd))+] (3.4)
where (·)+ represents the nonnegative value of the term in the parentheses.
Before proceeding with the analysis of the entrant’s idiosyncratic cost learning
decision, we consider the entrant’s tradeoffs between learning and not learning prior
to the auction. First consider the case where kd is zero – the idiosyncratic cost
information is free for the entrant. In the case of free information, the entrant would
choose to learn his idiosyncratic cost prior to the auction for two reasons: First,
learning helps the entrant avoid winning the contract at a loss if he is awarded the
contract and later discovers that his idiosyncratic cost results in a total cost greater
than the clearing price of the auction. Second, learning helps the entrant guard
against forgoing a contract which would have been profitable if the entrant knew his
idiosyncratic cost a priori. Now consider the case where kd > 0. When idiosyncratic
cost information is costly for the entrant, the entrant’s decision is unclear: He benefits
from learning the cost information for the reasons above, but paying the learning fee
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prior to the auction comes with risks. First, the entrant might learn his idiosyncratic
cost is high and lose the auction, but he may have also lost the auction if he did
not learn. Alternatively, he may realize a lower-than-expected idiosyncratic cost but
still lose the auction to the incumbent. Under both of these scenarios, the entrant
would have saved the learning fee if he did not learn his cost prior to the auction
and instead bid according to his expected cost.
Given this discussion, one may expect that the entrant will learn his idiosyncratic
cost prior to the auction if the information cost is small. Indeed, we now show a
fundamental result for this problem, which states that there is a single threshold
learning cost, k˜d, such that the entrant chooses to learn his cost prior to bidding if
and only if his learning cost is less than the threshold.
Proposition III.2. There exists a threshold learning fee, k˜d ≥ 0, such that the
entrant chooses to learn the realization of de prior to the auction if and only if
kd ≤ k˜d.
Here, k˜d represents the idiosyncratic learning fee that results in the entrant being
indifferent between learning and not learning prior to the auction. When the id-
iosyncratic learning fee is low, the information that the entrant reveals through the
learning process is more valuable than bidding without this information. Learning
allows the entrant to bid aggressively if he discovers a low cost, while learning that he
has a high idiosyncratic cost component before the auction prevents the entrant from
underbidding and losing money. However, as the cost of learning this information
increases, the benefits of learning the information diminish.
We also note that the threshold learning fee is independent of the common cost
information known to both suppliers; in fact, the threshold only depends on the
idiosyncratic cost distributions. The threshold is independent of the common cost
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realization, c, because both suppliers know the common cost a priori and incorporate
its realization into their bids. Hence, whether the suppliers have a low, medium, or
high common cost realization does not affect the entrant’s decision of whether to
learn his idiosyncratic cost.
3.4.2 Buyer-Optimal Learning Fee
Our results surrounding the supplier’s optimal bidding strategies and the entrant’s
threshold-based learning decision now allow us to find the buyer-optimal learning fee,
or the learning fee that minimizes the buyer’s total expected cost of procuring the
good or service. Given the entrant’s bidding strategies, the buyer’s expected costs
as a function of the learning fee under the entrant’s learn and bid without learning
strategies, E[Ωcd(kd)] and E[Ωc(kd)], respectively, are given by
E[Ωcd(kd)] = E[c] + E[max{di, de}] + β(kd − kd) (3.5)
E[Ωc(kd)] = E[c] + E[max{di,E[de] + kd}] + β(kd − kd). (3.6)
First, recognize that the buyer’s selection of kd will determine whether the entrant
learns his idiosyncratic cost realization prior to the auction: The entrant will learn
prior to the auction if and only if E[Πcd] ≥ E[Πc] for the given learning fee. Thus,
the buyer-optimal learning fee will incorporate the buyer’s preference of whether the
entrant learns de before the auction. To build this intuition, we once again consider
the case where the buyer has already chosen kd = 0. When information is free,
the buyer prefers that the entrant does not learn his idiosyncratic cost prior to the
auction. To see this result, consider the buyer’s expected cost under both scenarios. If
the entrant chooses to learn, the buyer’s expected cost is E[c]+E[max{di, de}]+β(kd−
kd); if the entrant does not learn, the buyer’s expected cost is E[c]+E[max di,E[de]]+
β(kd−kd). As the maximum function is convex, Jensen’s Inequality implies that the
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buyer’s expected cost when the entrant does not learn is less than the alternative.
Thus, the buyer will not want the entrant supplier to learn his idiosyncratic cost
when learning is free. Now consider the case where kd > 0. If the entrant chooses
not to learn, he will incur the learning fee if and only if he wins the auction; as a
result, the entrant incorporates kd into his bid. However, if the entrant learns prior
to the auction, the learning fee is sunk and excluded from the entrant’s bid. Thus,
the entrant’s bid when he chooses to learn after the auction incorporates a positive
term that is disregarded when the entrant chooses to learn. For this reason, the
buyer may prefer that the entrant learns prior to the auction.
This naturally leads to the question: If the buyer could force the entrant to learn
his idiosyncratic cost prior to the auction, when would she force the entrant to learn?
In the following result, we establish that the buyer and the entrant have “competing
objectives” — that is, when the entrant prefers not to learn his idiosyncratic cost
prior to the auction, the buyer would rather the entrant learn his cost (and vice
versa).
Proposition III.3. For all common cost realizations and idiosyncratic cost distri-
butions there exists a threshold idiosyncratic learning fee, k̂d ≥ 0, such that the buyer
prefers that the entrant learns his idiosyncratic cost realization if and only if kd ≥ k̂d.
Further, k̂d = k˜d; that is, if the buyer prefers that the entrant learns (does not learn)
his idiosyncratic cost for a given kd, the entrant does not want to learn (wants to
learn) his idiosyncratic cost. If kd = k̂d, the buyer and the entrant are indifferent to
the entrant’s learning decision.
The fact that the entrant and the buyer prefer opposite learning strategies for a
given kd can be understood by thinking of our model in the context of a zero-sum
game. For a fixed kd, the buyer’s expected cost consists of her expected payment to
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the incumbent plus her expected payment to the entrant. Meanwhile, the entrant’s
expected profit is a function of his expected payment and his expected cost (given
that he wins the auction). Intuitively, if an entrant prefers a certain learning strategy
because it results in a larger expected profit, the buyer will dislike that strategy for
the same reason.
The entrant has the prerogative to choose whether to learn prior to the auction
for a given kd. As a result, one may initially conclude that the buyer will be at
the mercy of the entrant’s decision, and will always experience the outcome that
results in her paying a greater expected cost. However, the buyer’s ability to set
the learning fee by releasing information at a cost of β(kd − kd) can allow her to
effectively predetermine the entrant’s learning strategy.
We now examine the buyer-optimal idiosyncratic learning fee, k∗d. The buyer’s
choice of k∗d depends on the proportion of the learning fee decrement that she has
to pay, β. For a given β, the buyer trades off the cost of subsidizing the entrant’s
learning, β(kd − kd), with the potential savings when the entrant chooses to “sink”
the learning fee and learn de prior to the auction.
The buyer wants to select the learning fee that minimizes her expected cost given
the entrant’s decision of whether to learn the information prior to the auction or after
the auction (if the entrant wins the contract). Proposition III.3 established that the
buyer and entrant have opposite preferences; this result provides two insights into
the buyer’s choice of learning fee. First, note that if the entrant supplier would
choose to learn his idiosyncratic cost for a given learning fee, the buyer would not
want the entrant to learn. However, the buyer cannot prevent the entrant from
learning by further reducing the learning fee due to the entrant’s threshold result
from Proposition III.2. Thus, the buyer will never incur costs to reduce the learning
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fee if the entrant would learn for a given fee; if the buyer paid a reduction cost, the
entrant would continue to learn for the reduced fee but have the same bid-down-to-
level in the auction (c+de). On the other hand, if it is not optimal for the entrant to
learn for a given learning fee — and hence the buyer prefers the entrant would learn
for such a fee — the buyer can induce the entrant to learn by reducing the learning
fee. Given these insights, we now address the buyer-optimal learning fee.
Proposition III.4. The buyer will reduce the idiosyncratic learning fee to
k∗d = min{max{k˜d, G−1i (β)− E[de]}, kd}. (3.7)
First, consider the outer term: The min{·} term confirms the aforementioned
intuition. When the entrant chooses to learn prior to the auction under the “default”
learning fee of kd (i.e., when k˜d > kd), the buyer will not reduce the learning fee
because any reduction will simply be a savings passed onto the entrant without any
benefit — the entrant is willing to pay kd and will bid his cost irrespective of the
learning fee because that cost is sunk.
However, if the entrant will choose not to learn under the default learning fee kd,
the buyer may reduce the learning fee. Such a reduction may be beneficial when the
entrant does not learn prior to the auction because the learning fee is incorporated
into the entrant’s bid of c+E[de]+kd. In this case, the optimal learning fee is captured
by the max{·} term. The intuition behind this term is as follows: Because the buyer
and the entrant have opposing preferences (i.e., the buyer and the entrant each
want the entrant to make the opposite learning decision), the buyer will reduce the
learning fee to the fee that makes the entrant indifferent to learning and not learning
(k˜d) unless such a reduction is too costly. In the case that the fee reduction to k˜d
is too costly, the buyer reduces the learning fee until the reduction costs outweigh
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the savings (which occurs when k∗d = G
−1
i (β)− E[de]). This equation represents the
learning fee where the buyer’s marginal cost of reducing the learning fee (β) equals
her marginal benefit. The buyer’s marginal benefit is represented by Gi(E[de] + kd),
the probability that the entrant loses the auction and thus sets the clearing price:
For a given sample path, the buyer will realize a decrease in procurement cost only
if the entrant sets the price — if the entrant wins the auction, the buyer will pay
c+ di regardless of the entrant’s bid. As a unit reduction in the learning fee results
in a unit reduction in the entrant’s bid, the buyer’s expected savings from reducing
the entrant’s learning fee is therefore equal to the probability that the entrant sets
the price.
One important implication of this result states that if the buyer has to pay at
least the full amount of the learning fee reduction (i.e. β ≥ 1), the buyer has no
incentive to reduce the learning fee. While a reduced learning fee will result in a bid
that is (kd− kd) less in expectation when the entrant is induced to learn prior to the
auction, the buyer has to pay β(kd − kd) up front, hence erasing the benefits.
3.5 Unknown Common Cost Case
We now address the case where the entrant is less informed of the common cost
component and must decide whether to pay the common cost learning fee prior
to the auction. Prior to making this learning decision, the entrant knows his own
idiosyncratic cost realization, de, and the common cost’s cumulative distribution,
F . For example, the entrant may know his own internal production costs (e.g., his
labor cost and typical yield rate for the item up for bid) but still needs to investigate
the raw material costs or the necessary licenses and certifications associated with
the contract. The entrant can learn the common cost realization (which is already
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known to the incumbent) by incurring the learning fee, kc, which is set by the buyer
at the outset of the procurement process. The sequence of events mirror Figure 3.2,
with kc and c replacing kd and de, respectively.
To analyze the unknown common cost case, we take the same steps as in §3.4
— we establish the entrant’s bidding strategies and study the entrant’s optimal
learning decision, and then analyze the buyer’s optimal learning fee. The nature
of the unknown cost information alters these decisions compared to the results of
§3.4. In §3.4, the only information discrepancy surrounds private, independent cost
values. The cost component that the entrant knew up-front — the common cost
— was a cost that was equal for both suppliers. By contrast, here the differences
between the suppliers’ knowledge of the common cost results in an added layer of
complexity due to the correlation between the entrant’s unknown cost component
and the incumbent’s total cost. Unlike in the previous case where the entrant’s
known common cost was equal to the incumbent’s common cost, the entrant may
believe that his idiosyncratic cost realization provides a cost advantage (if he has a
low realization) or disadvantage (if he has a high realization).
Given the learning fee, kc, the entrant must initially decide whether to learn the
common cost prior to the auction. If the entrant learns prior to participating in
the auction, he will pay kc, learn the common cost to fulfill the contract, and thus
know his true cost of supplying the good or service: c + de. The entrant’s expected
profit for this case is the same as equation (3.1) from §3.4; thus, the first result from
Proposition III.1 holds and the optimal bidding strategy when the entrant learns the
common cost (and thus his total cost) prior to the auction is b∗cd(c, de) = c+ de.
When the entrant does not learn prior to the auction, his expected profit,
81
E[Πd(bd(de))], is
E[Πd(bd(de))] = Ec,di [c+ di − (c+ de + kc)|c+ di ≥ bd(de)] · Pr(c+ di ≥ bd(de))
=
∫ di
di=di
∫ c
c=bd(de)−di
(di − de − kc)f(c)gi(di) dc ddi
=
∫ di
di=di
(di − de − kc)
(
1− F (bd(de)− di)
)
gi(di) ddi. (3.8)
Solving for the optimal bidding function requires applying the first order optimal-
ity condition to equation (3.8) given the cost distributions F and Gi. Such a solution
is trivial for some distributions (e.g., the uniform distribution), but more difficult or
intractable for other distributions. Such asymmetrically-informed bidding problems
have been studied in detail in common values settings (see, e.g., Wilson (1967) and
Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983)). Hausch (1987) also studies the pure common
values setting; he restricts the precision levels of the two suppliers’ signals and finds
the equilibrium bidding strategies for the first-price and second-price auctions. How-
ever, we cannot directly apply the previous equilibrium bidding results because the
entrant supplier in our model the entrant has an additional known cost component.
When the idiosyncratic cost is incorporated into the model, the entrant’s information
disadvantage can be mitigated or exacerbated by this cost asymmetry. For example,
consider the case where F , Gi, and Ge have support on [0, 100] and kc = 0. If the
entrant realizes an idiosyncratic cost of de = 0, he knows that he will have a lower
total cost than the incumbent with probability one. Even though he does not know
the common cost component, if the entrant’s bid-down-to-level is bd(de) = 0, he wins
the auction and is paid the incumbent’s bid, di + c, which is greater than de + c with
probability one. In this case, the entrant bids aggressively as his bid is less than his
expected cost, E[c].
Now consider the case where the entrant realizes an idiosyncratic cost of de = 100.
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He knows that he has a higher total cost than the incumbent with probability one, and
will bid down to at least bd(de) = 200 (the incumbent’s maximum total cost) to ensure
that he does not win the auction (if he won the auction, he would make negative
profit). Such a bid is conservative, as the entrant bids more than his expected cost,
100 + E[c]. We now formalize this intuition below.
Proposition III.5. Suppose the entrant knows his idiosyncratic cost, de. If the en-
trant pays the learning fee kc to learn the common cost realization prior to the auction,
the entrant’s optimal bid-down-to-level is his total production cost, b∗cd(c, de) = c+de.
If the entrant does not pay the learning fee prior to the auction, the entrant’s opti-
mal bid-down-to-level, b∗d(de), is continuous and nondecreasing in de. Further, there
exists a cost db−e such that the entrant uses a bid-down-to-level less than his expected
cost if de + kc < d
b−
e . Additionally, there exists a cost d
b+
e such that the entrant uses
a bid-down-to-level greater than his expected cost if de + kc > d
b+
e .
This result confirms the earlier intuition regarding the entrant’s bid-down-to-level
as a function of his realized idiosyncratic cost: When the entrant realizes a low id-
iosyncratic cost, he bids aggressively because he is fairly confident that he has a
lower cost than the incumbent, and does not want to spoil his chance to win the
auction by conservatively estimating the common cost. When the entrant has a high
idiosyncratic cost realization, he bids himself out of the competition (i.e., bids conser-
vatively) because he does not want to accidentally win the auction and lose money.
This is in contrast to the optimal bidding strategy in the unknown idiosyncratic
cost case, where the entrant’s bid-down-to-level always equals his expected produc-
tion cost; in the unknown common cost case, the correlation between the entrant’s
unknown cost and the incumbent’s total cost affects the entrant’s strategy.
We illustrate the entrant’s optimal bidding strategy through an example in Fig-
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ure 3.3, which shows the entrant’s optimal bid-down-to-level as a function of his
idiosyncratic cost realization, de. In this example, F ∼ U[20, 80], Gi and Ge ∼
U[0, 100], and kc = 5. When the solid line (the entrant’s optimal bid-down-to-level)
lies below the dotted line (the entrant’s a priori expected cost), it is optimal for
the entrant to bid aggressively, i.e., he bids down to a value less than his expected
total cost. When the solid line is greater than the dotted line the entrant bids
conservatively, i.e., he bids down to a value greater than his expected cost.
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Figure 3.3:
Entrant’s optimal bid-down-to-level as a function of his idiosyncratic cost realization,
de, when F ∼ U[20, 80], Gi, Ge ∼ U[0, 100], and kc = 5.
3.5.1 Entrant’s Learning Decision
The intuition behind the entrant’s bidding strategy when he does not learn the
common cost can also lend insight into the entrant’s learning decision. When the
entrant’s idiosyncratic cost realization is extremely high (low), the entrant is confi-
dent that he has a higher (lower) total cost than the incumbent supplier, and thus
bids with the aim to ensure that he loses (wins) the auction. In such extreme cost
realization cases, the goal driving the entrant’s bid is to “lock in” the outcome of the
auction, resulting in the entrant losing the auction and earning zero revenue (when
he has a high de) or winning the auction and being paid according to the incum-
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bent’s bid (when he has a low de). The entrant places greater value on learning the
common cost prior to the auction when he is uncertain of his cost ranking relative
to the incumbent — that is, when the entrant has a moderate idiosyncratic cost
realization. In the following result, we show that given the entrant’s realization of
his idiosyncratic cost, the entrant learns c if and only if the learning fee is less than
a threshold learning fee.
Proposition III.6. Given the entrant’s realization of de, there exists a threshold
k˜c(de) such that the entrant learns the common cost prior to the auction if and only
if kc ≤ k˜c(de).
The major distinction between this result and the analogous finding from the
unknown idiosyncratic cost case stems from the dependence of the threshold on the
entrant’s known cost information. In both cases, the entrant makes a threshold-
based decision whereby he chooses to learn if and only if the fee is less than the
threshold. However, while Proposition III.2 established that the threshold learning
fee is independent of the common cost realization due to the commonality of the
suppliers’ known costs, in this case the idiosyncratic cost realization influences the
threshold.
In Figure 3.4, we consider the entrant’s learning decision for the same numerical
example that resulted in the optimal bidding strategy illustrated by Figure 3.3.
Given the entrant’s idiosyncratic cost realization, the entrant will choose to learn
the common cost prior to the auction if and only if the learning fee is less than the
solid line. When the entrant realizes a high idiosyncratic cost, he does not expect
to have a lower total cost than the incumbent supplier. As a result, he has a low
threshold learning fee because he would rather bid conservatively without learning
the common cost than pay the learning fee up-front. The threshold learning fee
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is also low for extremely low idiosyncratic cost realizations because the entrant is
confident that he has a lower total cost than the incumbent and realizes that he will
be paid according to the incumbent’s bid if he wins the auction. As the incumbent
will incorporate the common cost into her bid of c+ di, the entrant prefers to delay
learning until after the auction to account for the rare possibility that the incumbent
has an even lower idiosyncratic cost realization than the entrant. Finally, we note
that the “hump” shape is left-skewed because the entrant is more likely to win the
auction — and hence incur the learning fee regardless of his learning decision —
when he has a relatively low idiosyncratic cost than if he realized a medium-to-high
idiosyncratic cost.
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Figure 3.4:
Entrant’s learning decision as a function of his idiosyncratic cost realization, de, when
F ∼ U[20, 80], Gi, Ge ∼ U[0, 100], and kc = 5.
3.5.2 Buyer-Optimal Learning Fee
In §3.4.2, the buyer-optimal idiosyncratic learning fee is described in Proposi-
tion III.4 as the maximum between the threshold where the entrant is indifferent to
learning (which does not depend on the entrant’s known cost) and the point where the
buyer’s marginal benefit of further reducing the fee equals her cost reduction fraction.
However, in this case, the buyer-optimal learning fee is not as straightforward due
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to the entrant’s learning threshold function, which depends on the entrant’s private
information. Thus, the buyer-optimal learning fee must account for the entrant’s
learning strategy for every possible realization of de.
The buyer-optimal learning fee balances the cost reduction fraction that is in-
curred by the buyer, α, with the expected changes in each entrant supplier type’s
bid (where a type refers to the entrant supplier’s private information, de). Let the
entrant’s optimal bid given the learning fee and his idiosyncratic cost realization be
represented as
b∗(kc, de) =

b∗cd(c, de) if kc ≤ k˜c(de)
b∗d(de) if kc > k˜c(de).
As the buyer will end up paying the winning supplier the drop-out bid of the losing
supplier, the buyer-optimal learning fee is given by
k∗c = arg min
kc∈[0,kc]
{
α(kc − kc) + E[max{c+ di, b∗(kc, de)}]
}
.
The buyer’s ability to reduce the common cost learning fee bears similarities to
the well-known “linkage principle” from the economics literature (see, e.g., Milgrom
(2004)). The linkage principle generally states that in auctions with affiliated in-
formation, the auctioneer can maximize the expected revenue by revealing all the
information she has regarding the object being sold. Thus, the procurement auction
equivalent states that the auctioneer minimizes her expected cost in auctions with
affiliated information by revealing as much information as possible. In short, “Hon-
esty is the best policy” (Milgrom and Weber (1982), page 1096). We note that this
is contradictory to the unknown idiosyncratic cost case, where we showed that the
buyer prefers that the entrant does not learn the unknown cost if the learning fee is
zero.
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The linkage principle, however, makes an assumption that is violated by our
model: The linkage principle assumes that the auctioneer does not incur costs to
release information. In our model, the buyer is unaware of the common cost com-
ponent’s realization — she knows the distribution function, which is also known
to both suppliers. If the buyer wants to help reveal the common cost information
to the entrant supplier, she must incur an α-fraction of the learning fee reduction.
Hence, the cost benefits of reducing the learning fee must be tempered by the buyer’s
fee-reduction costs. Nonetheless, the linkage principle suggests that the buyer may
enjoy significant savings if she reduces the fee the entrant incurs when he learns the
common cost component.
For instance, consider the numerical example studied throughout this section,
where F ∼ U[20, 80] and Gi and Ge ∼ U[0, 100]. The buyer-optimal learning fee is
k∗c = 0 for all α ∈ [0, 1] for this example; that is, the buyer will make it free for the
entrant to learn the common cost, even if that requires the buyer to pay the entire
default learning fee, kc. One reason why such a fee reduction is optimal surrounds the
entrant’s bidding strategy. Figure 3.3 depicts a wide range of idiosyncratic costs that
result in the entrant bidding greater than his expected production cost. Further, if
the entrant is endowed with a high idiosyncratic cost, there is a greater chance that
the entrant will lose the auction and set the price that the buyer pays the incumbent.
As a result, the buyer desires to lower the entrant’s bid for such idiosyncratic cost
realizations, and thus the buyer wants to encourage the entrant to learn prior to the
auction and then bid down to his true production cost. Conversely, when the entrant
has a low idiosyncratic cost and bids aggressively, the buyer does not enjoy as large
of a benefit because the entrant oftentimes wins the auction, and thus the entrant’s
aggressive bid does not directly translate to cost savings. In general, the buyer would
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rather limit the entrant’s conservative bids rather than encourage aggressive bidding
at low cost realizations.
While the entrant will always reduce the learning fee to zero in the previous
numerical example, such complete generosity is not found in all settings. Figure 3.5
considers the buyer-optimal idiosyncratic learning fee when F ∼ U[45, 55] and Gi
and Ge ∼ U[0, 100]. The arrows in the figure illustrate the buyer’s reduction of the
learning fee for a given α. While the buyer reduces the learning fee to zero when
α ≤ 0.63, the buyer partially reduces the learning fee for higher reduction fractions
if k∗c < kc.
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Buyer-optimal common cost learning fee as a function of the buyer-incurred cost reduc-
tion fraction, α, when F ∼ U[45, 55] and Gi, Ge ∼ U[0, 100].
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3.6 Proofs for Chapter III
3.6.1 Proof of Proposition III.1
When the entrant incurs the learning fee prior to the auction, he learns his total
cost to supply the item, c + de. It is trivial to show that this is the optimal bid-
down-to-level (b∗cd(c, de) = c+ de).
When the entrant knows c but not his idiosyncratic cost, his expected profit as a
function of his bid bc(c) is given by (3.2), which can be expressed as
E[Πc(bc(c))] = Gi(bc(c)− c)
[∫ di+c
bc(c)
di
gi(di − c)
Gi(bc(c)− c)
ddi − c− E[de]− kd
]
as the incumbent bids down to c + di. We want to find the entrant’s expected
profit-maximizing bid, so we differentiate with respect to bc(c):
dE[Πc(bc(c))]
dbc(c)
= gi(bc(c)− c)(c+ E[de] + kd)− bc(c)gi(bc(c)− c).
Applying the first order optimality condition results in b∗c(c) = c+ E[de] + kd.
3.6.2 Proof of Proposition III.2
We begin by examining how the entrant’s expected profit under the two learn-
ing strategies is affected by changes in the learning cost, kd. The following lemma
establishes the result.
Lemma III.7. The entrant’s expected profit when he chooses not to learn is non-
increasing convex in his learning cost, kd, and the entrant’s expected profit when he
chooses to learn is a decreasing linear function of kd.
Proof of Lemma III.7. First we show that the entrant’s expected profit is nonin-
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creasing convex in the learning cost under the no-learning strategy.
dE[Πc]
dkd
=
d
dkd
(
Gi(E[de] + kd) · (E[di|di > E[de] + kd]− (E[de] + kd))
)
(3.9)
=
d
dkd
(∫ di
E[de]+kd
xgi(x)dx− (E[de] + kd)G(E[de] + kd)
)
(3.10)
= −(E[de] + kd)gi(E[de] + kd)−Gi(E[de] + kd) + (E[de] + kd)gi(E[de] + kd)
(3.11)
= −Gi(E[de] + kd) ≤ 0 (3.12)
and
d2E[Πc]
dk2d
=
d
dkd
(
−Gi(E[de] + kd)
)
(3.13)
= gi(E[de] + kd) ≥ 0. (3.14)
The entrant’s expected profit is a decreasing linear function of the learning cost
under the “learn” strategy, as dE[Πcd]
dkd
= −1. 
We now establish another preliminary result.
Lemma III.8. The entrant prefers to learn his cost prior to the auction if kd = 0.
Proof of Lemma III.8. Consider the function
h(de) = Gi(de)(E[di|di > de]− de) (3.15)
which is convex as
d2h(de)
dd2e
= gi(de) ≥ 0. (3.16)
By Jensen’s Inequality, this implies that
E[h(de)] ≥ h(E[de]). (3.17)
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We note that E[Πc] = h(E[de]) and E[Πcd] = E[h(de)]. Thus E[Πcd] ≥ E[Πc] when
kd = 0. 
Combining Lemma III.7 and Lemma III.8, we have the result as a nonincreasing
convex function and a decreasing linear function will cross once when the decreasing
linear function has a larger value at the minimum possible argument of the function
(kd = 0) and the nonincreasing convex function is bounded below at zero.
3.6.3 Proof of Proposition III.3
To show both the existence of k̂d and that k̂d = k˜d, consider the learning fee where
the entrant is indifferent between learning and not learning prior to the auction
(which, by definition, is k˜d). This implies
E[Πcd] = E[Πc]
=⇒ −kd +
∫ de
de=de
∫ di
di=de
(di − de)gi(di)ge(de)ddidde =
∫ di
E[de]+kd
(di − E[de]− kd)gi(di)ddi.
(3.18)
Now consider the expected costs
E[Ωcd] = E[c] +
∫ de
de=de
[∫ de
di=di
degi(di)ddi +
∫ di
di=de
digi(di)ddi
]
ge(de)dde + β(kd − kd).
E[Ωc] = E[c] +
∫ E[de]+kd
di=di
(E[de] + kd)gi(di)ddi +
∫ di
di=E[de]+kd
digi(di)ddi + β(kd − kd).
Let the left-hand side of (3.18) be denoted by LHS and the right-hand side by RHS.
Then we have
E[Ωcd] = E[c] + LHS +
∫ de
de=de
∫ di
di=di
degi(di)ddige(de)dde + kd + β(kd − kd).
E[Ωc] = E[c] + RHS +
∫ di
di=di
(E[de] + kd)gi(di)ddi + β(kd − kd).
As a result, by equation (3.18), E[Ωcd] = E[Ωc], and we have that when the entrant
is indifferent, the buyer is indifferent. To show that when the entrant prefers to learn
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(not learn), the buyer wishes that the entrant would not learn (learn), the proof is
analogous – simply replace the equality in (3.18) by the appropriate inequality.
3.6.4 Proof of Proposition III.4
Consider how the the buyer’s expected cost under each choice is affected by kd:
dE[Ωcd]
dkd
= −β (3.19)
dE[Ωc]
dkd
= gi(E[de] + kd)(E[de] + kd) +
∫ E[de]+kd
di=di
gi(di)ddi
− gi(E[de] + kd)(E[de] + kd)− β
= −(β −Gi(E[de] + kd)) (3.20)
First, note that if the entrant chooses to learn his idiosyncratic cost under the
default learning cost kd, the buyer will not reduce the learning cost (as her expected
cost will increase and the entrant will never switch to not learning his cost prior to
the auction by Proposition III.2). On the other hand, if the entrant chooses not
to learn his idiosyncratic cost under kd, if −(β − Gi(E[de] + kd)) is positive, the
buyer can reduce her expected cost by reducing the learning cost (obviously, if β ≥ 1
this term cannot be positive). In this case, the optimal learning cost is the kd that
solves β = Gi(E[de] + kd) if the entrant does not switch to learning her cost prior to
the auction at this value. If the entrant prefers to learn at a learning fee equal to
G−1i (β)− E[de], then the buyer will reduce the cost to k˜d (which is therefore greater
than G−1i (β) − E[de]), as the entrant will switch to learning his cost prior to the
auction and any further decrease in the learning cost will result in the buyer paying
a higher expected cost by equation (3.19).
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3.6.5 Proof of Proposition III.5
The proof of b∗cd(c, de) is the same as the proof for Proposition III.1. For the case
where the entrant does not learn, differentiating (3.8) with respect to bd(de) results
in
dE[Πd(bd(de))]
dbd(de)
= −
∫ di
di=di
(di − de − kc)f(bd(de)− di)gi(di) ddi
where we note that f(bd(de)− di) = 0 if bd(de)− di /∈ [di, di]. The optimal bid solves
the first order optimality condition
dE[Πd(bd(de))]
dbd(de)
= 0
=⇒ −
∫ di
di=di
(di − de − kc)f(b∗d(de)− di)gi(di) ddi = 0
which is continuous in de for some b
∗
d(de) as f and gi are continuous (e.g., note that
any bd(de) in [c+ di,∞) is optimal when de + kc > di).
Further, b∗d(de) is nondecreasing in de as the entrant’s probability of winning the
auction and revenue given he wins the auction is independent of de. Thus, if an
entrant with idiosyncratic cost d1e prefers bd to b
′
d where bd < b
′
d, an entrant with id-
iosyncratic cost d2e < d
1
e will also prefer bd to b
′
d as the entrant’s expected revenue will
remain unchanged while the entrant’s expected cost to produce the item decreases
by d1e − d2e.
When de+kc < di, we note that the entrant will always have a smaller ex post pro-
duction cost than the incumbent (where kc is included as a production cost because
it is only incurred if the entrant wins the auction). Thus, given that the incumbent
bids her cost di + c ≥ de + c+ kc, if the buyer wins the auction he will make positive
profit. As a result, it is optimal for the entrant to bid such that he wins the auction
with probability one; such a bid is any bd(de) ≤ di + c. As c ≤ E[c], the entrant may
bid less than or equal to his expected cost, E[c] + de + kc.
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For de + kc > di, any auction that the entrant wins will result in him making
negative profit: When the entrant wins the auction, he is paid di + c, but his cost to
produce the item is de + c + kc ≥ di + c. Thus, it is optimal for the entrant to bid
such that he will not win the auction. The incumbent’s bid is capped at di + c, but
as the entrant does not know c prior to bidding, he must bid at least di + c to ensure
he loses the auction. For sufficiently small kc, di + c ≥ de +E[c] + kc and the entrant
bids greater than or equal to his expected cost; continuity results in the existence of
db+e .
3.6.6 Proof of Proposition III.6
The derivative of the entrant’s expected profit when he chooses to learn prior to
the auction is dE[Πcd]
dkc
= −1. The entrant’s expected profit when the entrant chooses
not to learn prior to the auction and bids down to the optimal level is given by
equation (3.8). After applying the envelope theorem (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991)), we have
dE[Πd(b∗d(de))]
dkc
=
d
dkc
∫ di
di=di
(di − de − kc)
(
1− F (b∗d(de)− di)
)
gi(di) ddi
= −
∫ di
di=di
(
1− F (b∗d(de)− di)
)
gi(di) ddi (3.21)
≥ −1 (3.22)
as equation (3.21) is the probability that the entrant wins the auction and thus incurs
the learning fee after the auction. We note that the inequality in (3.22) will become
a strict inequality for all non-trivial cases. (It will hold with equality if and only
if the optimally-bidding entrant will win the auction for all incumbent idiosyncratic
cost realizations; in such a case, the entrant will incur the learning fee regardless of
whether he learns before or after the auction.)
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Further, note that it is optimal for an entrant to learn prior to the auction if
kc = 0 (i.e., when learning is free) as the entrant’s bid when he learns prior to the
auction is the ex post optimal bid-down-to-level. Finally, for every de there exists a
kc such that de + kc > di; for such a kc, equation (3.22) holds with a strict inequality
and the entrant strictly prefers not to learn prior to the auction. In conclusion, for
every de there must exist a learning cost k˜c(de) such that E[Πcd] = E[Πd(bd(de))] for
kc = k˜c(de) and E[Πcd] < E[Πd(bd(de))] if and only if kc > k˜c(de).
CHAPTER IV
Entrant Cost Uncertainty and Pre-Auction Learning:
Experiments
4.1 Experimental Design
To study the entrant supplier’s learning and bidding decisions in practice, we de-
signed a laboratory experiment to simulate our research problem. This experimental
study also aims to provide insight into the buyer’s learning fee reduction strategy.
If suppliers do not behave as theory predicts when they are faced with the costly
opportunity to learn their cost prior to the auction, the buyer should account for
this behavior when he sets the learning fee. Likewise, if entrant suppliers use a
suboptimal bidding strategy, this can also affect the buyer’s learning fee decision.
The experiment had two treatments: An unknown idiosyncratic cost treatment
(which is analyzed in §3.4) and an unknown common cost treatment (analyzed in
§3.5). The common cost distribution and both suppliers’ idiosyncratic cost distribu-
tion were announced to be discrete uniform distributions on [0, 100]. Subjects played
the role of the entrant supplier, while the computer automated the role of the in-
cumbent supplier and subjects were aware that the incumbent bid optimally. After
a sufficient introduction with comprehension quizzes and example screens, subjects
were randomly matched with one of three data sets; each data set consisted of 20
known cost realizations, which were drawn randomly from the aforementioned dis-
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tribution (see Table 4.1 for the three data sets). Subjects participated in 20 periods
of a game where they were informed of their known cost component and then asked
if they would “hire a consultant” for a given learning fee before competing against
the incumbent in an auction. We used the strategy method to elicit subjects’ learn-
ing decisions for four different learning fees for each known cost realization. That
is, subjects were asked if they would want to hire the consultant for each learning
fee, and were told that their conditional strategy would be used prior to competing
with the incumbent. This method allows us to observe a subject’s complete learn-
ing strategy for every known cost realization. Before making a learning decision for
each learning fee, subjects had access to two decision support tools, which we will
refer to as “calculators”. The first calculator corresponded to the case where the
entrant did not learn prior to the auction; the subject could enter a hypothetical bid
and the calculator displayed the probability the subject would win the auction, the
subject’s expected profit if she won the auction, and the subjects’ expected profit
if she lost the auction for the given known cost, learning fee, and bid. The second
calculator corresponded to the case where the entrant learned prior to the auction;
the computer generated a random sample cost and the subject then entered a sample
bid before the calculator displayed the same three quantities as in the first calcula-
tor. The subject could use the two calculators multiple times before selecting their
decision.1
Table 4.1: Data sets of known cost realizations; each subject was randomly matched with one set.
Set 1 1 2 4 8 9 12 18 25 34 35 36 48 63 72 79 79 87 92 93 96
Set 2 1 5 13 16 23 30 44 47 49 50 50 51 54 55 58 73 79 83 88 93
Set 3 4 4 5 15 20 24 25 32 49 51 58 59 60 62 66 68 74 74 92 96
1See Appendix A for a transcription of the written and verbal instructions given to the subjects, pictures of the
screens displayed to the subjects, and comprehension quiz questions that subjects had to answer correctly before
proceeding with the paid portion of the experiment.
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For each known cost realization, subjects were first asked if they would hire the
consultant if the fee was 1. After they entered their decision, they were asked if
they would hire the consultant if the fee was 4; then 7; then 10. After entering the
four decisions, the subjects faced a summary screen where they could switch any
of their decisions. After the subject submitted their four decisions, the computer
randomly selected one of the four learning fees and applied the subject’s chosen
learning decision for that fee. If the subject chose not to learn for the given learning
fee, the corresponding decision support tool was available help the subject prepare
her bid for the auction. If the subject instead chose to learn for the given learning
fee, the computer revealed the subject’s previously-unknown cost and the appropriate
calculator was made available to help the subject prepare her bid. The subject then
submit her bid for the auction against the optimally-bidding incumbent supplier,
which was automated, and the outcome of the auction and the entrant’s profit was
displayed. The subject completed this process for the 20 known cost realizations
from their randomly-selected data set.
The subject pool consisted of undergraduate and graduate students at the Uni-
versity of Michigan. Subjects were paid a $5 show-up payment plus their average
profit from three randomly-selected periods, for an average total payment of $17.81
per subject. 83 subjects participated in the experiment, but five subjects’ data
had to be dropped from the analysis due to technical problems. Out of the 78
subjects who completed the experiment, 40 subjects participated in the unknown
common cost treatement and 38 subjects participated in the unknown idiosyncratic
cost treatment. An individual subject could only participate in one treatment and
each session lasted approximately 75 minutes. We programmed the interface and
conducted the experiment using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
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We will begin by examining the subjects’ learning decisions, then analyze their
bidding strategies as a function of their learning decision, and finally we will consider
the implications for the buyer’s decision regarding reducing the learning fee.
4.2 The Entrant’s Learning Decision
We begin by examining subjects’ learning decisions. First, theory suggests that
subjects should use a threshold policy for both treatments. We say that a subject
uses a threshold policy if every learning fee where the subject chooses to learn prior
to the auction is less than every learning fee where the subject chooses not to learn.
This was indeed the case; 95% of periods in Unknown Common Treatment and 88%
of periods in the Unknown Idiosyncratic Treatment contained a threshold learning
policy. However, only 27% (18%) of periods in the former (latter) treatment con-
tained a threshold policy resulted in the subject using the optimal threshold. While
subjects recognize that they should use a threshold learning policy, their relative
inability to select the correct threshold fee led us to study the structure of their
threshold as a function of their known cost realization. In the unknown common
cost case described in §3.5, we found that an optimally-behaving entrant supplier’s
learning decision depends on his idiosyncratic cost realization. Conversely, in the
unknown idiosyncratic cost case theory states that the entrant’s idiosyncratic cost
learning decision is independent of his common cost realization. In Figures 4.1 and
4.2 we graph the optimal threshold (dotted line) and the entrants’ average threshold
(bold solid line) for the two treatments. A linear fit of the experimental data is also
displayed as a thin solid line.
First, note that it appears subjects recognize that their learning threshold should
depend on their idiosyncratic cost realization in Figure 4.1 and should not depend on
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Figure 4.1:
Subjects’ average willingness to pay to learn prior to the auction (Unknown Common
Treatment)
Figure 4.2:
Subjects’ average willingness to pay to learn prior to the auction (Unknown Idiosyncratic
Treatment)
their common cost realization in Figure 4.2. To statistically test this observation, we
ran eight Logit regressions with the binary learning decision as the dependent variable
and the known cost realization as the independent variable. The final two columns
of Table 4.2 report the results. In the Unknown Common Treatment, subjects learn
significantly less often as their idiosyncratic cost realization increases for fees of
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4, 7, and 10 (p < 0.10; we note that p < 0.12 for a learning fee of 1). In the
Unknown Idiosyncratic Treatment, the subject’s known common cost realization
does not have a statistically significant influence on their learning decision for any
learning fee (p > 0.17), which agrees with the analytical result that the entrant’s
learning threshold is independent of the known common cost. The “probability
of learning” columns in Table 4.2 summarize the percent of periods that a subject
learns prior to the auction for each learning fee as well as the theoretically-calculated
fraction of periods that an entrant finds it optimal to learn. A non-parametric test for
trend in learning decision across the ordered learning fees (Cuzick, 1985) confirmed
that subjects learn less as the learning fee increases in each treatment (for a p-value
of 0.01). In the Unknown Common Treatment, subjects under-learn for the lowest
learning fee and over-learn for the highest learning fee, while in the other treatment
subjects under-learn for fees 1, 4, and 7 and over-learn when the learning fee is 10.
We note that the learning probabilities of the three smallest fees agree with the
ordering of the actual and optimal thresholds in the second treatment – i.e., that
the subjects have a lower than optimal threshold when they know the common cost.
The tendency for subjects to under-learn confirms similar findings in the literature.
Ro¨theli (2001) found that subjects who have the ability to learn about the prospects
of two projects tend to incorrectly assess the value of information, leading to under-
learning; Connolly and Thorn (1987) also found under-purchase of information in
three related experiments and hypothesize that difficulty in estimating the benefit
of an information source, coupled with the certainty of the information’s cost, may
cause this finding.
Table 4.3 shows the results of regressing the subject’s average learning threshold
fee on the optimal threshold fee and the known cost realization. In the unknown
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Table 4.2: Entrant’s probability of learning prior to the auction
Probability of Learning Logit Regression
Learning Fee Experiment Theory Coefficient Standard Error
Unknown Common
1 0.73 0.88 -0.0043 0.0028
4 0.66 0.68 -0.0073* 0.0026
7 0.43 0.46 -0.0119*** 0.0026
10 0.33 0.23 -0.0120*** 0.0027
Unknown Idiosyncratic
1 0.77 1.00 0.0024 0.0030
4 0.68 1.00 -0.0015 0.0027
7 0.47 1.00 -0.0008 0.0025
10 0.31 0.00 -0.0037 0.0027
For each learning fee in each treatment, the “probability of learning” represents the fraction of periods that subjects chose
to learn in the experiment and the fraction of time that optimally-behaving subjects would learn. For the Logit regressions,
the binary dependent variable equals 1 if the subject chose to learn in the given period and the independent variable is the
subject’s known cost realization. There were 800 and 760 observations for each learning fee in the Unknown Common and
Unknown Idiosyncratic treatments, respectively. Significance is denoted: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
common cost case given by column (1), the average subject learning threshold is
decreasing in their realized idiosyncratic cost (p < 0.01); the average threshold is
too high for extremely low and high idiosyncratic cost realizations, and too low for
low-to-medium realizations. This evidences that subjects understand the general
intuition of the Unknown Common Treatment, but moderate their changes to their
threshold learning fee. Further, subjects fail to comprehend the nuance behind hav-
ing a low threshold for extremely low cost realizations; however, such a mistake is
minor and requires a deep understanding of the benefits of using a low threshold for
such realizations (namely, that the entrant can bid aggressively and save the learning
fee in the unlikely case that the incumbent has an extremely low cost). Confirming
the result from the Logit regressions, the subjects also recognize that their learning
threshold should be constant in their cost realization in the Unknown Idiosyncratic
Treatment (column (2))2; however, their average threshold is 34% lower than the
optimal threshold.3 We note that the constant term in the regression is omitted
because the optimal learning threshold is a constant (equal to 7.74 for all common
cost realizations).
2p > 0.6 for the known cost realization coefficient from Table 4.3
3This 34% difference is significant for a p-value of 0.01.
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Table 4.3: Regression of actual learning threshold on optimal learning threshold and known cost
(1) (2)
Coefficients Unknown Common Treatment Unknown Idiosyncratic Treatment
Optimal Learning Threshold -0.000063 0.677***
(0.0473) (0.0651)
Known Cost Realization -0.0242*** -0.00299
(0.00814) (0.00577)
Constant 6.14***
(0.733)
Observations 3,032 2,672
Number of Subjects 40 38
Robust standard errors clustered at the subject level reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The dependent variable is the subjects’ actual learning threshold (i.e., the learning fee where the
subject switches from learning to not learning prior to bidding). The first column corresponds to the Unknown Common
Treatment and the second column to the Unknown Idiosyncratic Treatment. The constant term is omitted from column (2)
as the optimal learning threshold is a constant. The specification is GLS with subject random effects, and the observations
are restricted to periods where the subject used a threshold learning policy.
4.3 The Entrant’s Bidding Strategy
While the first part of our experiment investigated the subjects’ learning decisions,
the second half of the game tested the subjects’ bidding strategies given their stated
learning decision. While the subject made four learning decisions for each period
of the game, only one learning decision was implemented due to use of the strategy
method. Thus, each subject generated 20 bids (1 per period), and the distribution
of bids made after the subject learned their unknown cost approximately followed
the distribution from §4.2. Figures 4.3(a) and 4.3(b) show the subjects’ bids when
they choose to learn the unknown cost prior to bidding. When the entrant learns
prior to the auction, he has a weakly dominant strategy to bid his true production
cost of c+ de; in both treatments, subjects recognize the optimality of this strategy
and bid equal to their cost.
Intuitively, it is more difficult for a subject to determine the optimal bid when
the subject does not learn the unknown cost prior to the auction. Figures 4.4(a)
and 4.4(b) graph the subjects’ bids for this case. One can immediately notice that
subjects’ bids are more variable than the bids from the case where the entrant learns
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prior to bidding. In the Unknown Common Treatment, the dotted line represents the
entrant’s expected cost given the subject’s idiosyncratic cost realization, while the
solid line represents the subject’s optimal bid. The difference between the expected
cost and optimal bid supports the result of Proposition III.5; the optimally-behaving
entrant should bid much lower (higher) than his expected cost when he realizes a
low (high) idiosyncratic cost. In the Unknown Idiosyncratic Treatment, the subject’s
optimal bid is equal to his expected cost given the common cost realization. While
the subjects’ bids are more variable than in the case where the subjects learn, they
appear to correlate with the subject’s expected cost minus a constant term.
(a) Unknown Common Treatment. (b) Unknown Idiosyncratic Treatment.
Figure 4.3: Bidding strategies when the subjects learn the unknown cost prior to bidding.
(a) Unknown Common Treatment. (b) Unknown Idiosyncratic Treatment.
Figure 4.4: Bidding strategies when the subjects do not learn the unknown cost prior to bidding.
To further study the subjects’ bids, we regressed their bids on the subjects’ learn-
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ing decision and expected cost given the cost information the subject has prior to
bidding.4 The results of the regression are summarized in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4:
Effect of learning decision and entrant’s expected cost after making the learning decision
on the entrant’s bid
(1) (2)
Coefficients Unknown Common Treatment Unknown Idiosyncratic Treatment
Learn Prior to Bidding 39.1*** 20.9***
(8.14) (5.37)
Expected Cost Prior to Bidding 1.11*** 1.02***
(0.0729) (0.0631)
Learn & Expected Cost Prior to Bidding -0.200*** -0.102
(0.0685) (0.0689)
Constant -36.0*** -20.4***
(8.10) (5.84)
Observations 800 760
Number of Subjects 40 38
Robust standard errors clustered at the subject level reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The dependent variable is the subjects’ bid. The first column corresponds to the Unknown Common
Treatment and the second column to the Unknown Idiosyncratic Treatment. The specification is GLS with subject random
effects.
In both treatments, the regressions’ constant terms imply that subjects bid sig-
nificantly less than their expected cost when they do not learn prior to the auction
(p < 0.01). This is in agreement with the literature (e.g., Kagel et al. (1987)), which
has found that subjects tend to bid aggressively in second price auctions with un-
known information. For example, Cooper and Fang (2008) study second-price private
value (forward) auctions and find that subjects overbid; they find support for both
a ‘joy of winning’ hypothesis and a ‘spite’ hypothesis. Such aggression is a benefit
to the buyer in our model, as the aggressive bidding results in lower expected costs.
When the subjects learn prior to the auction, the “learn prior to bidding” coefficients
essentially cancel the constant terms in both treatments, and the subjects bid equal
to their expected cost.
When subjects do not learn before bidding, their bid increases one-for-one with
4If the subject learns prior to bidding, the subject’s cost is known (c + de). If the subject does not learn, the
subject’s expected cost is the known cost plus the expectation of the unknown cost plus the learning fee (because
the entrant will have to pay the learning fee if he wins the auction).
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expected cost in both treatments (a Wald test (Harrell, 2001) for the coefficient on
Expected Cost being equal to one finds p > 0.10 in both treatments). When subjects
learn their unknown cost prior to bidding they also increase their bid close to one-for-
one with cost (albeit slightly but significantly slower, p < 0.05 for both treatments).
For the case where the subject’s optimal bid does not equal his expected cost (i.e.,
the case where he does not learn when he does not know the common cost), we also
regressed the subjects’ bids on the optimal bid; however, we found that the subjects’
expected cost was a much better predictor of the subjects’ bids. While theory predicts
that the amount an entrant’s bid varies from his expected cost should depend on the
idiosyncratic cost realization, we could not find this to be statistically significant.
A similar result was also shown in Eyster and Rabin (2005), which argued that a
“cursed equilibrium” (where a subject underestimates the correlation among bidders’
information) in the context of a second price auction would result in the subject
bidding closer to his ex ante expected cost instead of the optimal bid. The subjects’
bidding when they do not learn the common cost carries additional considerations for
the buyer. As the subject bids approximately equal to their expected cost minus a
constant, this results in the entrant’s bid having a larger deviation from the optimal
bid at certain idiosyncratic cost realizations. Namely, compared to the optimal bid
subjects tend to bid too high at low idiosyncratic cost realizations and too low at
high costs. From the buyer’s perspective, a lower-than-optimal bid (at high cost
realizations) is a welcomed strategy: a lower bid results in reduced procurement
costs. Conversely, the conservative bids at low cost realizations inflate the buyer’s
costs. In the next subsection, we further investigate how the buyer’s costs are affected
by the subjects’ learning and bidding decisions.
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4.4 Implications for the Buyer’s Fee Reduction Decision
This experiment was designed to directly measure entrant subjects’ learning de-
cisions and bidding strategies. However, an equally important question surrounds
the buyer’s procurement costs and choice of learning fee, which is set at the outset
of the sourcing mechanism. In §3.4.2 and §3.5.2 we found that, in theory, reducing
the learning fee can have a significant effect on the buyer’s cost; not only can the
buyer influence the entrant’s learning decision by reducing the fee, but she can also
influence the entrant’s bid when he chooses not to learn. However, the magnitude of
these savings depends on the entrants’ subsequent learning and bidding decisions.
We previously established that subjects tend to under-learn (e.g., in aggregate
subjects have a lower threshold learning fee than the optimal threshold) and bid
suboptimally when they do not learn their unknown cost. Given the data generated
by our experiment, we now investigate the effects of these suboptimal decisions on
the buyer’s strategy. Table 4.5 summarizes the buyer’s average experimental and
theoretical cost as a function of the learning fee, where the buyer’s cost is the maxi-
mum of the entrant’s and the incumbent’s bids. Theory predicts that the buyer can
enjoy significant savings5 from reducing the learning fee in the unknown common
cost case. However, such savings are not apparent in the experiment: Reducing the
learning fee by one step6 does not result in a statistically significant reduction in the
buyer’s cost.7
In the unknown idiosyncratic cost case, the buyer’s theoretical expected cost is
equal for learning fees 1, 4, and 7 because the entrant supplier will learn for all learn-
5Note that the theoretical cost values in Table 4.5 are theoretical calculations, and thus are statistically distinct.
6A “step” refers to the buyer reducing the learning fee to the next-smallest value (i.e., from a fee of 10 to a fee of
7).
7A Wilcoxon rank-sum test (Wilcoxon, 1945) of the buyer’s average cost differences between each step in learning
fees all result in p > 0.10 for both treatments (even for the 5.1 unit decrease in average cost obtained from reducing
the fee from 10 to 7 in the Unknown Common Treatment). This is also evident from the 95% confidence intervals in
Table 4.5.
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Table 4.5: Buyer’s average costs for each learning fee.
Learning Fee Buyer’s Average Cost 95% Confidence Interval Theoretical Cost
Unknown Common
1 116.7 [111.5, 121.9] 123.8
4 114.9 [109.7, 120.1] 130.6
7 114.5 [108.9, 120.0] 135.3
10 119.6 [114.2, 124.9] 139.8
Unknown Idiosyncratic
1 108.7 [103.2, 114.3] 116.7
4 111.2 [105.4, 117.1] 116.7
7 109.5 [103.6, 115.4] 116.7
10 113.0 [107.9, 118.1] 118.0
The buyer’s average cost for the given learning fee is the average of the price the buyer would pay for the contract in a
given period (i.e., the maximum of the subject’s bid and the automated incumbent’s bid). The theoretical cost for a given
learning fee is the average price the buyer would pay for the contract in a given period if the subject made the optimal
learning decision and then bid optimally (where it is assumed that the actual unknown cost for the given period is revealed
to the optimally-bidding entrant if the entrant learns).
ing fees less than 7.74, regardless of his common cost realization. These theoretical
costs confirm our finding from §3.4, which stated that if the learning fee reduction
fraction is small enough, the buyer will find it optimal to reduce the learning fee
until the entrant is indifferent to learning before the auction. In our experiment,
however, reducing the learning fee was not statistically shown to reduce the buyer’s
costs (p > 0.10).
To further explore why the buyer does not expect to benefit from changes in the
learning fee in our experiment, Table 4.6 breaks down the buyer’s marginal benefit
of reducing the fee by the learning decisions that subjects chose at each fee.8 The
marginal benefit for each pair of learning decisions represents the reduction in the
buyer’s average cost; for each learning fee that was randomly selected for the auction,
the respective subject’s learning decision for the higher of the two fees and the buyer’s
cost in the auction were recorded. That subject’s learning decision at the lower fee
was then retroactively applied and a bid based on the subjects’ empirical distribution
was used to calculate the change in the buyer’s cost.9
8We restricted the data for this table to periods that contained a threshold learning decision (95% and 88%
of periods in the two treatments, respectively) due to the focus on the marginal benefit generated by the subject
switching from not learning at the higher fee to learning at the reduced fee.
9In the case of “L→L”, the subject was assumed to bid the same value when the learning fee was reduced as
subjects bid statistically equal to c + de when they knew both costs. For “N→N”, the subject’s bid was decreased
according to the fee reduction (3) times the slope coefficient from the regressions in Table 4.4. For “N→L”, the
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Table 4.6: Buyer’s marginal benefit of reducing the learning fee.
Learning Fee Buyer’s Marginal Benefit Pr(Outcome)
Reduction Overall L→L N→N N→L L→L N→N N→L
Unknown Common
10→ 7 0.5 0.0 1.2 -3.1 0.66 0.24 0.09
7→ 4 -2.0 0.0 1.2 -8.5 0.43 0.29 0.28
4→ 1 0.3 0.0 1.3 -0.7 0.28 0.62 0.10
Unknown Idiosyncratic
10→ 7 -0.5 0.0 1.3 -6.4 0.69 0.19 0.12
7→ 4 -0.1 0.0 1.3 -1.8 0.45 0.29 0.26
4→ 1 -0.6 0.0 0.5 -5.4 0.30 0.51 0.19
The notation “10→ 7” and “N→L” refers to the buyer reducing the learning fee from 10 to 7 and the subject not learning
prior to the auction when the fee is 10 and learning for a fee of 7, respectively. The buyer’s marginal benefit numbers are
the decrease in the buyer’s average cost and the “Pr(Outcome)” gives the fraction of periods where the subject would make
the given learning decisions at the respective learning fees.
First, we note that the buyer does not benefit if the subject learns under both
fees; under either fee, the subject will bid equal to his production cost c + de, so
the auction’s outcome and buyer’s payment will not change. Second, if the subject
does not learn under both fees, the buyer’s auction payment is expected to decrease
by approximately 1.2 (depending on the level of the fees). We found in §4.3 that
subjects’ bids correlated closely with their expected cost when they did not learn,
so the buyer can expect to save an amount approximately equal to the fee reduction
when the entrant sets the price of the auction (i.e., loses the auction). The buyer
can expect the entrant to set the price of the auction about half of the time; such
a “sanity check” confirms the relative size of the buyer’s marginal benefit when the
subject does not learn under both fees.10 Finally, when the subject switches from
not learning at the higher learning fee to learning at the reduced fee, the buyer’s cost
is expected to increase. This is a consequence of the subjects’ bidding strategies: In
the Unknown Idiosyncratic Treatment, the average subject bids 34% lower than the
optimal bid (which is equal to the subjects’ expected cost). This aggressive bidding
buyer’s newly-learned production cost, c+ de, was used. The “L→N” case does not apply due to the restriction to
threshold learning strategies.
10Such a calculation ignores the interaction between the entrant’s known cost and learning decision for the given
fee — in the Unknown Common Treatment, subjects who do not learn for a given fee are more likely to have a higher
known cost realization than those who learn, which in turn affects the probability the entrant will set the price —
but we believe our explanation most clearly communicates the intuition for this case.
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behavior benefits the buyer. However, when the subject learns at the reduced fee,
the subject bids equal to his cost, c + de. Thus, by reducing the learning fee the
buyer loses the subjects’ aggressive bidding tendencies and pays a higher expected
cost. This effect is also evident in the Unknown Common Treatment. However, we
remind the reader that in this treatment subjects were shown to bid equal to their
expected cost minus a constant, which had a flatter slope than the entrant’s optimal
bidding strategy. This results in the subject bidding aggressively with respect to the
optimal bid at high idiosyncratic cost realizations — which benefits the buyer — and
conservatively with respect to the optimal bid at low idiosyncratic cost realizations
— which raises the buyer’s costs. As the subjects’ bids only affect the buyer’s cost
when the subject loses the auction, the benefit of the subjects’ aggressive bidding
behavior at high cost realizations outweighs the effect of higher subject bids at low
cost realizations.
In summary we find that theory suggests that the buyer may be able to save
money by reducing the learning fee, but in our experiment the costly reduction of
the learning fee does not have a statistical impact on the buyer’s costs! The primary
driver of this result is an entrant’s aggressive bidding strategy when he does not learn
prior to bidding. This suggests that buyers may be able to save time, money, and
resources that they otherwise would devote to going “above-and-beyond” in helping
their potential suppliers compete against other suppliers.
4.5 Conclusions from Theoretical and Experimental Results
In practice, entrant suppliers looking to enter a buyer’s supply base may be ini-
tially uncertain of their costs to produce the good or service up for bid to the buyer’s
specifications. Such cost ambiguity can stem from a variety of sources — the entrant
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may need to pinpoint the amount of materials needed to make the good or the licenses
and regulations that need to be obtained (which can be classified as common costs
that all suppliers must incur) or determine the labor time and yield rate associated
with their manufacturing process (a supplier-specific cost). While such a situation is
relatively common among suppliers looking to do business with new buyers, both the
theoretical and experimental operations literature fail to address our model’s setting:
First, we analyze the entrant’s decision of whether to pay a learning fee to resolve
his cost uncertainty after finding his bidding strategies. Additionally, we consider
the buyer’s option to reduce the learning fee by expending her own costly effort. We
find theoretical results and perform an experiment to elicit subjects’ learning and
bidding decisions to determine if the buyer’s learning fee reduction strategy should
be altered from the theoretically-prescribed strategy. To our knowledge, this is the
first experimental research problem to examine costly learning decisions in an auction
setting.
We find that an entrant supplier should utilize a threshold learning policy, whereby
the entrant learns the total cost to supply the buyer if the learning fee is less than the
threshold. In the case where the unknown cost information is a supplier-specific cost,
this threshold is independent of the known common cost; however, when the common
cost is unknown the entrant’s threshold is greater for medium idiosyncratic costs —
where the entrant is likely to be competitive with the incumbent — and smaller for
extreme cost realizations due to the buyer’s relative certainty of his cost ranking
with respect to the incumbent supplier. The experiment confirmed that subjects
recognized the optimality of a threshold learning strategy, but tended to use too low
of a threshold for the majority of cost realizations. Further, subjects recognized that
their threshold learning fee should not depend on their cost realization when the
112
known cost is a commonly-shared cost, but should depend on their supplier-specific
idiosyncratic cost realization. However, they did not fully capture the nuances behind
the threshold in the latter case, instead using a threshold that decreased in their
idiosyncratic cost.
Subjects adhered to the weakly-dominant strategy of bidding equal to their total
cost when they chose to learn their unknown cost information prior to the auction.
When subjects did not learn their unknown cost, they bid according to their expected
cost minus a constant term; this aggressive bidding resulted in the buyer saving pro-
curement costs. While such a bidding strategy correlates well with the optimal bid in
the unknown idiosyncratic cost case, this strategy diverges from the entrant’s opti-
mal bid for the other treatment. In the unknown common cost case, theory predicts
that an entrant should bid less than his expected cost for low idiosyncratic costs to
ensure that he wins the auction, and should “price himself out” of auctions where
his idiosyncratic cost is high by bidding greater than his expected cost. Instead, the
subjects’ empirically-described strategy results in higher than optimal bids at low
costs and lower than optimal bids at high realizations.
Subjects’ threshold learning policy — which results in the entrants learning less
often than theory prescribes — and tendency to bid aggressively (i.e., less than
their expected cost) when they do not learn prior to the auction carries important
implications for the buyer’s choice of learning fee. In §3.4.2, theory states that a buyer
should reduce the learning fee to the point where the entrant is indifferent to learning
prior to the auction (if the buyer’s cost reduction fraction is sufficiently small). The
buyer-optimal learning fee is more complicated when the entrant does not know the
common cost; §3.5.2 explains how the buyer must account for the change in learning
strategies and bids for every supplier type when determining the optimal learning
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fee. However, the subjects’ tendency to under-learn and then bid too aggressively
when they do not learn prior to the auction results in the buyer realizing virtually
zero cost savings when she reduces the learning fees! While practitioners still must
ensure that their RFQ’s and information made available to potential suppliers is
sufficient, our experiment finds that the buyer need not take great pains to make it
as easy as possible for suppliers to learn their total cost to produce the buyer’s item
prior to the competitive sourcing event.
CHAPTER V
Conclusion
Sourcing has recently emerged as an important research topic in operations and
supply chain management; the relative novelty of the field has left many practical
questions unanswered by the current literature. This dissertation aims to address
issues for buyers and suppliers when the supply base consists of both incumbent and
entrant suppliers.
In Chapter II, the pool of incumbent suppliers are at-the-ready to bid for a multi-
unit contract. Meanwhile, the buyer may want to perform a costly supplier recruit-
ment round, where she discovers and recruits entrant suppliers to join her supplier
pool. We develop a novel “test auction” sourcing technique, where the buyer may
hold an auction among the incumbent suppliers for a small quantity of the item be-
fore she decides how many entrant suppliers to recruit, and analyze the test strategy
when the buyer can also use a reserve price. Comparative statics results provide a
guide for determining when the test auction strategy is most beneficial in practice.
We numerically compare the test with reserve price strategy to the optimal mecha-
nism, and find that the test with reserve price strategy performs well considering its
ease of implementation. Finally, we address two different extensions to the model:
First, we discuss intractability issues when the buyer uses a first-price sealed-bid auc-
114
115
tion instead of the modeled second-price open-bid auction; regardless of these issues,
we extend the comparative statics results to the sealed-bid first-price and the re-
verse Dutch auction formats. Second, we allow the buyer to update her belief on the
entrant suppliers’ cost distribution based on the incumbent suppliers’ bid-down-to
levels in the first test auction and show that related forms of the comparative statics
results hold when the buyer only allows the incumbent supplier who is awarded units
in the first test auction to compete with entrant suppliers in future auctions.
In Chapter III, we study an entrant supplier who competes against an incumbent
supplier for a contract while facing a cost information disadvantage. It is natural
for an incumbent supplier — who has previously produced the good or service (or a
previous generation of the good) for the buyer — to be more informed regarding her
costs of fulfilling the contract than an entrant supplier, who has not had experience
with the particular good or service that the buyer is procuring. We distinguish
between which type of cost is unknown to the entrant supplier: First we study the
case of an unknown idiosyncratic cost component and then we study the unknown
common cost component case. We discuss the differences in the entrant’s learning
and bidding strategies and the buyer-optimal learning fee reduction amounts between
the two cases.
While the entrant’s bidding strategy is straightforward when he decides to learn
prior to bidding, this is not the case when he has an unknown common cost compo-
nent — we find that the entrant bids “aggressively” (less than his expected produc-
tion cost) when he realizes a low idiosyncratic cost and “conservatively” (greater than
his expected production cost) when he realizes a high idiosyncratic cost. Conversely,
when the entrant’s idiosyncratic cost is unknown, his optimal bidding strategy does
not deviate from his expected production cost. We find that the entrant’s choice of
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whether to resolve his cost uncertainty prior to bidding depends on his idiosyncratic
cost realization but not on his common cost realization. Finally, we find that the
buyer-optimal learning fee — that is, a proxy for the amount of “help” the buyer
gives the entrant — is a simple calculation in the unknown idiosyncratic cost case
as the buyer is able to predict the entrant’s learning decision based solely on the
learning fee; the buyer will reduce the entrant’s learning fee until the entrant is in-
different between learning and not learning unless the buyer’s cost of fee reduction
is too expensive. However, the buyer’s choice of learning fee is much more complex
in the unknown common cost case as the entrant’s learning decision depends on his
private information.
Finally, in Chapter IV we study the research problem from Chapter III in a con-
trolled laboratory experiment with undergraduate and graduate students from the
University of Michigan. Subjects recognized the optimality of a threshold learning
strategy, but used too low of a threshold for the majority of cost realizations. Fur-
ther, subjects recognized that their learning strategy should not depend on their
cost realization when the known cost is a commonly-shared cost, but should depend
on their supplier-specific idiosyncratic cost realization. However, they did not cap-
ture the nuances behind the threshold in the latter case, instead using a threshold
that decreased in their idiosyncratic cost. Subjects adhered to the weakly-dominant
strategy of bidding equal to their total cost when they chose to learn their unknown
cost information prior to the auction. When subjects did not learn their unknown
cost, they bid according to their expected cost minus a constant term; this aggressive
bidding behavior resulted in the buyer saving procurement costs. While such a bid-
ding strategy correlates well with the optimal bid in the unknown idiosyncratic cost
case, this strategy diverges from the entrant’s optimal bid for the other treatment.
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Finally, the subjects’ tendency to under-learn and then bid too aggressively when
they do not learn prior to the auction results in the buyer realizing virtually zero
cost savings when she reduces the learning fees from the highest fee studied in the
experiment; this finding was not predicted by theory.
In conclusion, the operations management literature often assumes that suppliers
are ex ante identical, and hence does not fully address some practical considerations
in many sourcing situations. We address two specific issues when a buyer’s potential
supplier pool consists of incumbent and entrant suppliers: How a buyer can best
structure the sourcing process when potential supplier recruitment is costly, and a
buyer’s and entrant supplier’s optimal actions when the entrant must pay a learning
fee to realize his total cost. We hope that the insights derived throughout this
dissertation provide guidance to academics and practitioners alike.
APPENDIX
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APPENDIX A
Appendix for Chapter IV: Entrant Cost Uncertainty and
Pre-Auction Learning: Experiments
The following is a transcription of the unknown common cost treatment’s instruc-
tions for the experiment described in Chapter IV (the instructions for the unknown
idiosyncratic cost treatment are analogous). Section A.1 covers the written instruc-
tions that are displayed to subjects via the z-Tree interface. Section A.2 transcribes
the quiz questions that subjects must answer to confirm that they comprehend the
instructions before proceeding to the game. Finally, §A.3 contains screenshots of the
z-Tree interface and verbal instructions that are read by the experiment’s facilitator.
A.1 Written Instructions for the Unknown Common Cost Treatment
Welcome to today’s session and thank you for coming! At this point, please
do not talk to any other participant, or look at their computer. If you have any
questions, raise your hand and somebody will come help you individually. We are
studying individual decision-making when subjects have the opportunity to learn
information. You will play 20 periods of a game. At the end of the experiment, you
will be paid the $5 show up fee plus your earnings from the experiment.
In this game, an incumbent supplier and an entrant supplier are competing to
supply a buyer with an item. An “incumbent supplier” is a supplier who has been
making the item for a while. An “entrant supplier” is a new supplier who is trying
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to enter the market – unlike the incumbent supplier, they have not made the item
for the buyer in the past. The entrant is competing with the incumbent for the
buyer’s business. You will be the ENTRANT supplier, and the computer will be
the incumbent supplier. Both suppliers will submit bids to the buyer, and the buyer
will award the contract to the supplier who bids the lowest. The winning supplier
(i.e., the supplier who bids the lowest) will be paid the losing supplier’s bid (i.e., the
larger of the two bids). For example, if the incumbent (computer) bids $120 and the
entrant (you) bids $90, the entrant (you) will be awarded the contract and you will
be paid $120 to supply the item.
Of course, it costs money for the suppliers to build the item. For each supplier,
their cost is the sum of two costs:
1) PRODUCTION COST (labor, machining, etc.), which is different for each supplier
2) REGULATORY COST (governmental fees, etc.), which is the same for each sup-
plier.
Thus, each supplier’s total cost to make the item is given by
Incumbent’s Cost = Incumbent’s Production Cost + Common Regulatory Cost
Entrant’s Cost = Entrant’s Production Cost + Common Regulatory Cost
Suppose the incumbent’s (computer’s) production cost is 25, the entrant’s (your)
production cost is 40, and the regulatory cost is 60. Then each supplier’s cost to
make the item is:
Incumbent’s Cost = 25 + 60 = 85
Entrant’s Cost = 40 + 60 = 100
Both suppliers know their own production cost but not their opponent’s. All they
know about their opponent’s production cost is that it is a whole number between
0 and 100, with each number being equally likely. For example, you may know that
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your production cost is 39, but all you know about the incumbent’s production cost
is that it is between 0 and 100 (with each number equally likely). Similarly, the
incumbent knows her own production cost but does not know your production cost.
The regulatory cost is EQUAL for both suppliers. The incumbent supplier knows
the regulatory cost because she has produced a similar item in the past. The entrant
supplier (you) does NOT know the regulatory cost. You do know that the regulatory
cost is a whole number between 0 and 100, with each number being equally likely.
The incumbent is aware that you know this range of costs. The regulatory cost and
your production cost are independent of each other (if the production cost is high
that doesn’t necessarily mean the regulatory cost is high or low).
To make the item, you need to LEARN the regulatory cost. To learn the regu-
latory cost, you must hire a consultant and pay a “consultant fee”. If you pay the
consultant fee, the consultant will research the necessary regulations and reveal the
regulatory cost. You can DECIDE to pay the consultant fee up-front so you learn
the regulatory cost before submitting your bid. You don’t have to hire the consultant
before the auction, though; instead, you could bid WITHOUT learning the regula-
tory cost. If you then *WIN* the auction, you’d have to pay the consultant fee in
order to examine the regulatory process and learn the regulatory cost of making the
item. On the other hand, if you *LOSE* the auction, you don’t have to pay the
consultant fee.
Your Decision: Hire the consultant before or after bidding? In summary,
at the beginning of the game you have 2 options:
A) Pay the consultant fee and learn the regulatory cost BEFORE submitting your
bid to the buyer, or
B) Submit your bid without learning the regulatory cost. In this case, if you win the
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auction you must then pay the consultant fee to learn the regulatory cost in order to
make the item. If you lose the auction, you do not need to pay the consultant fee.
Main Trade-Off: Under A), you know your total cost before submitting a bid,
but you had to pay the consultant fee up-front. Under B), you know your production
cost but you don’t know the regulatory cost when you submit a bid, but if you end
up losing the auction you don’t have to pay the consultant fee.
The Incumbent’s Bid: As previously described, the incumbent supplier (com-
puter) already knows her own production cost as well as the regulatory cost (which
is the same for both you and the incumbent). Thus, the incumbent does NOT have
to learn the regulatory cost, and therefore does not have to pay the consultant fee.
For this experiment, the incumbent (computer) will ALWAYS bid equal to her total
cost (production cost + regulatory cost). For example, if the incumbent’s production
cost is 12 and the regulatory cost is 60, the incumbent (computer) will bid 72.
Your monetary payoff depends on your profit from randomly-selected periods of
the game. Your Profit = Your Revenue - Your Costs.
Your Revenue = What the buyer pays you. If you *win* the auction, the buyer pays
you the incumbent’s bid (which is the highest bid). If you *lose* the auction, the
buyer does not pay you anything (the buyer will pay the incumbent instead).
Your Costs = What you actually pay. If you *win* the auction, you must make the
item, and thus you will pay three costs: the consultant fee (which you may have
paid prior to bidding), the regulatory cost, and your production cost. If you *lose*
the auction, you do NOT make the item. As a result, you do not pay the regulatory
cost or your production cost. HOWEVER, if you hired the consultant to learn the
regulatory cost prior to bidding, you already paid the consultant fee.
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A.2 Comprehension Questions
A.2.1 Comprehension Quiz 1
Suppose your production cost is 20 and the consultant fee is 7. You don’t know
the incumbent’s production cost, and at this point you have to decide whether to
pay the consultant fee to learn the regulatory cost before you bid, or bid without
learning. Imagine that you pay the consultant fee and learn that the regulatory cost
(which is the same for both you and the incumbent) is 45. Now you have to submit a
bid to the buyer. You bid 70. After the incumbent also submits a bid, it is revealed
that the incumbent bid 87.
Question 1a: Which supplier gets to make the item for the buyer (i.e., wins the
auction)? (Answer: Entrant)
Question 1b: How much does the buyer pay you to make the item (your revenue)?
(87)
Question 1c: What is your total cost to supply the item (including the consultant
fee)? (72)
Question 1d: What is your profit? (15)
A.2.2 Comprehension Quiz 2
We consider the previous example except we change the incumbent’s bid to 60.
Question 2a: Which supplier gets to make the item for the buyer (i.e., wins the
auction)? (Incumbent)
Question 2b: How much does the buyer pay the incumbent to make the item? (70)
Question 2c: How much does the buyer pay you in this example (your revenue)?
(0)
Question 2d: What is the total cost that you incurred in this example? (7)
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Question 2e: What is your profit? (-7)
A.2.3 Comprehension Quiz 3
Now suppose your production cost is 52 and the consultant fee is 4. You don’t
know the incumbent’s production cost, and at this point you have to decide whether
to pay the consultant fee to learn the regulatory cost before you bid, or bid without
learning. Imagine that you decide to bid without hiring the consultant. Thus, you
have to bid without knowing the regulatory cost – all you know is that it is a whole
number between 0 and 100, with each number being equally likely. You have to
submit a bid to the buyer. You bid 110. After the incumbent also submits a bid, it
is revealed that the incumbent bid 95.
Question 3a: Which supplier gets to make the item for the buyer (i.e., wins the
auction)? (Incumbent)
Question 3b: How much does the buyer pay the incumbent to make the item?
(110)
Question 3c: What is your profit? (0)
A.2.4 Comprehension Quiz 4
We consider the previous example except we change the incumbent’s bid to 145.
Question 4a: Which supplier gets to make the item for the buyer (i.e., wins the
auction)? (Entrant)
Question 4b: How much does the buyer pay you to make the item? (145)
Since you have won the auction, you must hire the consultant to discover the regu-
latory cost. After you pay the consultant fee (4), you discover the regulatory cost is
80.
Question 4c: What is your total cost to supply the item (including the consultant
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fee)? (136)
Question 4d: What is your profit? (9)
A.3 Screenshots and Corresponding Verbal Instructions Read to Sub-
jects by the Facilitator
This is the first screen that you will see (Figure A.1 is displayed on subjects’
screens). You’ll note that at the top it states your production cost. In this case,
your production cost is 16. It also poses the main question for this screen — what
would you do if the consultants fee was 1? On the left-hand side of the screen you
have two calculators that you can use to test possible choices before you make a
decision. The one on top corresponds to the case where you choose NOT to hire
the consultant before the auction. It lists your production cost, the consultant fee,
and reminds you that the regulatory cost is a whole number between 0 and 100,
with each value being equally likely. You can then enter a bid and click “calculate”.
Let’s have everyone enter a bid of 47 and click “calculate”. You’ll note that it gives
you three numbers — first, your probability of winning the auction is 0.89 — that
means that if you bid 47 your probability of winning the auction is 89%. The second
number is your average profit if you win the auction. In this case, if you win the
auction, you will, on average, make a profit of 41.53 — you won’t get exactly 41.53,
this is average over your possible profits if you win the auction. Finally, the third
value is your average profit if you lose the auction — in this specific case, if you lose
the auction your profit will be 0 because you won’t have any revenue and you will
have paid zero costs.
Now let’s look at the second calculator (Figure A.2). This corresponds to the case
where you choose to hire the consultant before the auction. Remember, when you
choose to pay the consultant fee prior to the auction, you’ll learn what the regulatory
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Figure A.1: Subjects’ screen with the first decision support tool.
cost is before you have to bid. So, to get a sample regulatory cost realization, click
the create regulatory cost sample button now. You’ll see your production cost (16),
the consultant fee that you already paid (1), and a sample regulatory cost appear
— the sample regulatory cost will be different for everyone in the room, and it will
change every time you click that create regulatory cost sample button. To see that
happen, click “create regulatory cost sample” again and see it change right now.
Okay, now we can enter a bid to use this calculator. Let’s have everyone enter a
bid of 100 and click the calculate button. You’ll see the same three quantities be
calculated as they were in the other calculator. After you’ve explored using this
calculator for a minute and figured out if you would choose to pay the consultant
fee prior to bidding, you can click “proceed” on the right hand side of the screen
to enter your decision. Click “proceed” now. Now we can enter our decision. Lets
have everyone choose to HIRE the consultant before bidding, and then click the red
“submit decision” button.
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Figure A.2: The second decision support tool.
Okay, now you submitted your decision and you are taken to another screen
(Figure A.3). You’ll notice that the only thing that has changed here is now the
consultant fee is equal to 4 instead of 1. At this point, you’ll repeat the process
for this new consultant fee. You can use the two calculators to the left and when
you are ready to make a decision you click “proceed” on the right. Let’s have
everyone enter a random bid on the top calculator and click “calculate”, and then
also create a regulatory cost sample on the bottom calculator. Also enter a bid on
the bottom calculator as well — don’t worry about what you enter here, the bids
on the calculators don’t count towards your payoff. Click “proceed” on the right
and let’s have everyone choose to not hire the consultant on this screen, and click
“submit decision”.
You are now taken to a screen where the only thing that has changed again is the
consultant fee (Figure A.4). Now, the consultant fee is 7, and it is asking whether
you’d like to hire the consultant before bidding or wait until after the auction and
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Figure A.3: Subjects’ screen with a consultant fee of 4.
only hire him if you win the auction. You are free to use the calculators to the left for
a minute, and when you’re ready to enter a decision click “proceed” and let’s have
everyone choose to hire the consultant for this decision and click “submit decision”.
Figure A.4: Subjects’ screen with a consultant fee of 7.
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This will be the last screen that looks like this for a while (Figure A.5) — you’ll
notice that now the consultant fee is 10. Let’s have everyone click “proceed” and
choose NOT to hire the consultant before bidding and click “submit decision”.
Figure A.5: Subjects’ screen with a consultant fee of 10.
Now you’ll see a screen where your decisions have been summarized (Figure A.6).
At this point, if you have any regrets on the past four decisions that you made, you
can change your mind and switch your answer. For this example we won’t have you
switch anything — just click “submit final decisions”.
Now we’ll actually get to play the game (Figure A.7)! At this point, the computer
randomly selects one of the four hiring decisions you were just asked about — 1, 4,
7, or 10. In this case, it picks a consultant fee of 4. It’ll automatically apply the
decision that you submitted on the previous screen for a consultant fee of 4 once you
click the “proceed” button. Go ahead and click “proceed”.
For a consultant fee of 4, you chose NOT to hire the consultant before bidding
(Figure A.8). So, the calculator that corresponds to the case where you do not hire
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Figure A.6: Subjects view and have the option to change their selected decisions.
Figure A.7: A learning fee is randomly selected.
the consultant prior to the auction appears. You’ll note that you will have to submit
a bid to compete against the computer in the auction, so to help you come up with
the best bid possible that can hopefully win you a lot of money, we’ve provided the
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calculator again. Enter a sample bid and click “calculate” to see the results. You
can use this calculator as many times as you’d like. Once you are ready to enter
your real bid for the auction, click “proceed” on the right hand side.
Figure A.8: The corresponding decision support tool appears.
In this case (Figure A.9), we’ll have everyone submit a bid of 47 — don’t worry,
your payoff is not based on this example so don’t worry if you don’t think this is the
best bid. So, enter 47 and click “submit bid”.
You’ll note that at this point the screen (Figure A.10) reveals the incumbent’s
cost information and you can see that the incumbent had a production cost of 21,
there is a common regulatory cost of 32, and the incumbent bid a total of 53. Now
you can click “calculate profit” to see how you fared in the auction.
This screen (Figure A.11) now shows a summary and you can see that you won
the auction! You’ll also note that while you made money in this auction, you made
very little — your profit in this auction is 1. This was calculated by taking your
revenue minus your costs, and your revenue was the incumbent’s bid (53) and your
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Figure A.9: Subjects then enter their binding bid for the auction.
Figure A.10: The incumbent’s private information is revealed after the subject submits his bid.
costs were the consultant fee of 4, the regulatory cost of 32, and your production cost
of 16. Add all that up and your profit is 53 minus 52, or 1. Okay, now we’re ready
to begin the experiment. You’ll play the same game that we just walked through 20
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times. Don’t worry, it’ll actually go pretty fast as you get a feel for the calculator
and the different questions. Make sure to take your time because your earnings will
depend on your performance in the game we’ll select three random periods and pay
you the average of what you earn in those three periods plus your $5 show-up fee.
Let me know if you have any questions by raising your hand and you can go ahead
and get started!
Figure A.11: A summary screen with the subject’s profit for the period.
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